

As if a famine
a universal war of devastation
had cut off the supply
of every means of subsistence

Gabriela Massuh: **The True owners of the land or the rampage
of the mining industry in Latin America**

Maristella Svampa: **Mining Model, The Social Resistance
and Imaginaries of Development**

Gabriela Massuh: **Slaughter**

**Eight Questions About What Changed in
Neo-Extractivism Since 2008**

Can One Compare a Back to a Mountain?

Chapter 1 No 1c

The residents of the towns of Cenizo and Tres Estrellas near Colquisiri, Huaral Peru, express their worries about the degree of poisoning of their ground. They demand a statement by the authorities on this poisoning caused by the Maria Teresa mine operating in the entire district, 80 kilometers from the capital.

The mine not only poisons the water and the ground, but also the people, who have headaches and often retch when swallowing, as if they had something in their throat that seeks to prevent this swallowing, that also no longer allows them to concentrate enough to form entire sentences, that determines the rate of miscarriages and the increase in cancer.

All this can be recorded statistically, just like trains travel ten times around the planet, or it can be recorded as the effect of a capacity that heaves 2,000 tons of rock on one day inside the mountain.

The residents urgently request that the authorities write letters to the company that in April was called Trevali Resources and had an address in Toronto, which then merged with Glencore International and was then sold to Kria, whose address is unknown, and little time remains to find it out if the hausse of lead continues on the markets.

Source:
http://intranet2.minem.gob.pe/web/dgaam/certificado_EIAS_new.asp?Anio=2003&Mes=00&radio1=F&submit=Consulta

Translated by Karl Hofmann / Edited by Matthew Hyland, 2015
Establishment of Matter of Facts / 3 / Every Day - Trevali Resources

The true owners of the land or the rampage of the mining industry in Latin America

Gabriela Massuh, for Potosí Principle, 2009

“We don’t want another Potosí” was the answer given by Evo Morales to the Spanish state television, Televisión Española, during his latest visit to Spain in September 2009. He was referring to the possibility of cooperation strategies between Spain and Bolivia, as well as to the wish of several European countries to participate in the industry of lithium extraction. Lithium is a strategic mineral for energy storage, and more than half of the world’s reserves are in Bolivia. Since Evo Morales has been at its helm, the Bolivian government receives a rent of above 51% from all the profits that its natural resources generate. If we consider this stipulation from within the framework of the history of Bolivia in particular, and more generally, that of the current state of the mining industry in Latin America, it is clear that Bolivia presents a unique case.

The mining industry in Latin America constitutes the latest episode in the continuous draining of its natural resources. The new owners of the crown are not as glamorous as they once were in colonial times. Now they are transnational corporations mostly from Canada, the USA, the UK and Australia. Those that operate in the area are, among others, Rio Tinto, Barrick Gold Corporation, Freeport Mac Moran, BHP-Billiton, Newmont, PlacerDome, Meridian Gold, Exeter Resource Corporation, Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold Inc., and Minera Andes. The Latin American Observatory of Environmental Conflicts (OLCA) and the executive organisation of the Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America (OCMAL) have counted a total of 337 open-pit mining projects along the whole of the Andean mountain range, from Mexico to Ushuaia. More than half of these mines are in conflict with the neighbouring communities.¹ The common denominator in all of these conflicts is the violation of human and environmental rights denounced by the surrounding communities, claims that are systematically ignored by the different governments and corporations involved.

In contrast to traditional mining, which would dig in the stone, in search of the best veins in the mineral, by opening underground galleries, today mining is done on the surface, with open pits. The new method consists in blowing up with dynamite a large part of the ground and the subsoil, in order to then treat the stone with lixiviation, a hydro-metallurgical process where great quantities of water are used to move chemical acids (sulphuric acid and sodium cyanide) and separate valuable minerals from those that are not. The process requires huge quantities of water, which is generally a scarce resource in the areas where the mines are set up. In order to obtain such amounts of water, the mining companies access the potable watersheds directly, which they then pollute with the acid used to treat the mineral dust. Great amounts of energy are also required, as well as an equipment capable of digging up a whole mountain in a matter of hours. The mining sites reach great expanses of land where giant craters are dug out, which can sometimes reach 150 hectares in extension and up to 200 metres in depth. This extraction method allows the mining company to extract not just gold and silver, but also any metal that it might deem strategic for commercialisation. No other industrial activity is as devastating as open-pit mining, due to the destruction that it provokes.²

In order to adequately describe the voraciousness of this system, the sociologist Maristella Svampa has coined the term “mega mining”, which makes reference not only to the pharaonic scale of the projects, but also to the legal sanction that frees up vast geographical areas from any kind of state control or regulation.³ Only a “disembedded” economy can instance the state’s voluntary renunciation of its sovereignty over vast parts of its territory. As a way to understand these types of practices, Elmar Altvater following Karl Polnanyi, identifies them as part of a “global disembedding” process. This implies an inversion of the traditional function of the economy: from being a structuring element of social cohesion, it has turned into a mechanism that pursues only its own

¹ <http://www.olca.cl/ocmal/index.php>

² www.noalamina.org

³ Maristella Svampa, Mirta Antonelli, **Transnational Mining, Development Narratives and Social Resistance**, Buenos Aires: 2009.

interests. A disembedded economy, out of control and on a rampage, requires unregulated areas in order to be independent of all functionality other than its own growth.⁴ Mega mining is a symptom of an economy's disembedding process, which is more serious than the case of fossil fuels because its level of destruction is much more radical, on top of the fact that, in this case, there is no going back. The devastating annihilation of nature, the ejection of the indigenous communities from their places of origin, the pollution of the water that sustains entire areas of land, the destruction of millenary cultures and the unrestricted violation of human rights are the price paid for components that are, at best, necessary for the development of modern technologies (such as in the case of lithium); and at worst, they are just the sumptuous element in the speculation bubble (as in the case of gold). Nothing at all would change in the world if gold ceased to be extracted. Only the mining industry itself would notice.

The history of mega mining begins in the early 1990s, at a time when countries in Latin America had accumulated a huge debt with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. They had almost reached a state of bankruptcy, "on their knees before their creditors", in the words of Roberto Dromi, Argentinian minister for public works and services in Carlos Ménem's 1991 cabinet. This situation allowed the different Latin American parliaments to pass all kinds of laws, as long as it kept the creditors away. And so, a number of recommendations by the World Bank were gradually adopted, in the promise that it would provide a way out of the slump. One by one, all the countries in the region changed their national legislation with laws that deregulated foreign investment, gave foreign corporations the right to resort to international arbitration, and established agreements to protect direct foreign investment.

Between 1995 and the mid-2000s, mining regulations and laws were also modified in the whole region, in very similar ways. Most of these new regulations do not limit the land's usufruct in time and when they do so, it is in very vague terms. When there is mention of a time limit in the license, it is of twenty or thirty years, which implicitly means: *until depletion is complete*. Paradoxically, within this set of laws aimed at underlining the state's good will as regards foreign investment, there is a specific clause that declares mining "of public interest". Some examples:

Argentina: The exploitation of mines, their exploration, licensing and all consequent acts, have the character of a public utility. The state provides mining companies with fiscal stability for 30 years as well as various tax benefits (Decree 456/1997 and 417/2003). "Fiscal stability" implies tax exemptions establishing a unique contribution of 3% on the value of the metal extracted at the mine's mouth, that is, the price of the metal before its processing. The type of metals that are extracted or how much of it is actually extracted, are details that the government does not have any control over: they are settled in an affidavit by the mining company itself. At the time of writing, in Argentina there are 65 different mega mining projects in operation, as well as what is probably the most outrageous project of the continent: Barrick Gold is exploiting Pascua Lama, which is located in the heart of the Natural Reserve of San Guillermo, at 4,000 metres high, and where we can find two glaciers of potable water that the mining corporation intends to "move to another site" in order to access the metal seam.⁵

Colombia: The mining industry is declared of public utility and social interest in all of its forms and stages. Therefore, at the behest of the interested party and following the procedure established in this Code, all the necessary expropriations of property and goods and all the rights attributed to them will be ordered, in order to guarantee the efficient activity and development of the mining

⁴ Elmar Altvater, **Das Ende des Kapitalismus, wie wir ihn kennen. Eine radikale Kapitalismuskritik** [The End of Capitalism as We Know It. A Radical Critique of Capitalism], Münster: 2005

⁵ Pascua Lama covers an area that extends over parts of Chile and Argentina. It covers a large part of the natural reserve of San Guillermo (UNESCO, 1980) which is 900,000 hectares large. During a "secret" session in 1989, the council of the Province of San Juan de-nationalised 17,000 hectares. This fact was not known to the public until, ten years later, maps had to be drawn in order to allocate the first mining licenses. It was also discovered that part of the de-nationalised land had been purchased for giveaway prices by those same councilmen who had written the de-nationalisation law. See Svampa-Antonelli, 2009: 292. There is a vast amount of information about this outrageous case in Pacua Lama, in various languages, on the Internet.

industry. (Law of Mining, Art. 13, 2001) At present, there are 38 open-pit mining projects in Colombia.

In El Salvador the Mining Law of 2001 has undergone reform in order to reduce the tax on mining profits from 4% to 2%. El Salvador, a small country with basically just one big water basin, awarded, after this law reform, 26 open-pit mining exploration permits, which cover more than 1,000 km², almost 8% of the national territory.

Mexico established its Mining Law in 1992. At the turn of the millennium there was a law reform and certain articles in the law were rewritten in order to prolong the time limit on the licenses, to be able to award more than one project to the same company, and to deregulate foreign capital investments. The Mexican Network of those Affected by Mining (REMA) organised its first conference in June 2008, in the community of Tamacapulín, in the region of Jalisco. The meeting concluded with the Declaration of Tamacapulín, which states that: "... government policy of the past 25 years has handed over the land and its entrails to transnational and transnationalised mining corporations. 200,000 km², that is, 9 % of the national territory has been handed over and gifted in the form of mining licenses".⁶

Guatemala approved a new mining law in 1997. It extended access to mining licenses to transnational corporations, and suspended the spatial and temporal limits on licenses. It awarded the owner of the license the exclusive right to identify and locate possible exploration areas, *within their respective territorial limits, without any limits as regards the depth of extraction in the subsoil*. It also granted them the right to extend the type of metals extracted and established a tax to be paid of 1%. *This amount is based on an affidavit stating the volume of commercialised mining products, in relation to the internal and international market value* (Articles 21, 32, 62). Tax is only paid on the metals declared in the affidavit, and not on the so-called "acid or strange soil" found in the extraction process, including gold, silver and other inert metals and soil, when they are not yet separated.

The new mining codes recur in similar form in all the countries of the region, without exception. They are based on a set of principles which also provides the legal basis for the monoculture-based agricultural industry and agro-business. The main ideological tenet is the conceit that nature has to be *efficient* too. The notion of efficiency, which is traditionally applied to describe human performance, has been used in marketing practices in order to describe certain industrial products, and it is now being employed in the context of nature and biology. Mega mining, agro-business products, and if one wishes, even genomics as well, belong to that new spectre of development which positions the human being as a demiurge capable of overcoming all the obstacles that might stand in the way of their wishes. This new human uses technology exclusively, as they dispense with human strength, human time, and human labour. This is the brave new world that corporations, the media and politicians celebrate as the information and knowledge society, with a single mantra that promises progress and happiness for all. This euphoria, which is reminiscent of that of the Titanic passengers when leaving Southampton, hides the desolate face of its own *hubris*: after us, the deluge.

Within the mining context, the lexicon of the new model began to be fashioned in the year 2000 by the Mining, Minerals & Sustainable Development Programme (MMSD), requested by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) for the nine most powerful mining corporations. The objective was to establish a strategy in order to make large scale mining around the world "viable".⁷ This Programme, which was presented at various International conferences, provided the foundation for a number of slogans intended to prevent conflict by using all kinds of persuasion. In the draft report prepared for the Agenda for Change, an International conference organised by the Global Mining Initiative (GMI) and held in Toronto in 2002, the MMSD laid the foundations for a plan for Latin America centred around two key ideas: sustainability and

⁶ Luis Hernández Navarro, *La Jornada*, Mexico, 21 July 2008

⁷ Mirta Anonelli has carried out an impressive semiotic analysis of the different discursive strategies employed by corporations in order to clean up their image, prevent conflict and establish the basis for the myth of the mining industry as a generator of wealth for all. In Svampa-Antonelli: 2009

governability.⁸ The document omits the only truth of the case: in the medium term, there is no way of avoiding polluting potable water tables with the acids used in mega mining. It was approved in the Toronto conference in May of that same year, and established the notion of *sustainability* as an instrument in conflict prevention. It was basically a statement of principles, as if the single fact of describing an action would change the reality of it. The document suggested that a “sustainability fund” be created, managed by the World Bank and an International Institute for Indigenous Populations. Both of these objectives reveal what are, for the mining corporations, the main causes of conflict: indigenous populations and environmental harm.

And so “sustainable mining” was born as the main weapon to fight against poverty in Latin America, and put it on course to “sustainable development”. This is the discourse at the bottom of the mega mining industry’s attempts to provide a specific profile of itself in the eyes of public opinion in those countries with natural mineral deposits. At the same time, the number of euphemisms used to fashion this profile, makes it impossible to actually discern the predatory nature of the different processes that it undertakes. This discursive line is discriminatory: all of those opposed to its practices or protesting against it are against development, and worthy of being branded heretics. In other words, this discourse justifies the growing tendency to criminalise anti-mining protest, and this has already resulted in several deaths along the Andes. In less than ten years, Latin America’s national states allowed transnational corporations to expand and hegemonise the socio-productive map not only of the mining sector, but also that of the fishing sector, of the hydrocarbon sector, and that of the agro-industry as well. This *sustainable development* model signals a regression in relation to the different anti-hegemonic models that characterised the previous century. With very little difference to the old colonial situation, Latin America assumes today, of its own free will, a new framework of technological coloniality, by which their people and landscapes are handed over as hostages in a system that, in the name of development, puts them on course to a certain death by debt.

Can nation states commit suicide? Beyond the rhetorical dimension, this question asserts itself every time the interests of a certain industrial sector are imposed with such force that the basic bonds between citizens in a society are eroded. The discourse of efficiency, and sustainable development, of the technological fight against poverty, is today a *foundational episteme*. Specifically, in the case of mega mining, this new discourse is applied as if it was an advertising campaign. It gets more and more intense as social protest increases. Mining corporations, now identified as “agencies of social and corporate responsibility” have co-opted by both licit and illicit means, the will of civil servants, the media, and, most important of all, universities.

At first sight, Evo Morales’ statement in Spanish television, asserting that “we don’t want another Potosí”, seems to be setting a different course. The history of Bolivia is paradoxical: its extraordinary mineral wealth turned it into one of the poorest countries in the world. Potosí gold, extracted exclusively by an indigenous workforce, was during colonial times, the main engine of European capitalism. In the first half of the Twentieth Century, tin magnates (Patiño, Aramaic and Hochschild) accumulated in Bolivia the greatest fortunes of the planet. The nationalisation of the mines in 1952 contributed to the kindling of a miner and working class conscience, which was then gradually subjugated by the different governments that followed, always more prone to addressing their own personal interests and submitting to the will of transnational corporations. In light of this history, the current Bolivian government is truly facing a definitive change. After nationalising the hydrocarbon industry in 2006 it was the turn of the mining industry, which is now in the hands of the state and small private cooperatives. The coexistence of cooperatives and state mining companies is not free of conflict. An extreme case was the confrontation that took place in Huanuni in 2007 when sixteen workers died. The root of the conflict is however of a territorial nature and cannot be compared to the social and environmental confrontations between indigenous communities and mining corporations, which are taking place all over the region.

⁸ <http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/G00977.pdf>

Bolivia has 55% of the world's reserves of lithium, a mineral that is used in the manufacture of thermonuclear weapons, batteries, pharmaceutical drugs, and, most importantly, in the car industry. On a global scale, lithium is today one of the most important strategic resources in the world. Some of the corporations that have been hounding the Bolivian government in the past few years without much luck, are Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Nissan, Ford, BMW and General Motors. In the opening of the International Forum on Lithium, which took place in La Paz in late October 2009, Evo Morales announced the "beginning of the industrialisation era" of lithium and he concluded his presentation with the promise that "... the Bolivian state would be the owner of the industry, and foreign corporations, state-based, private or transnational, should accept their role as partners but not owners".⁹

The will of the Bolivian state to reaffirm its sovereignty by assigning a different status to mining corporations represents a radical change in relation to the rest of Latin America. However, the extractivist development model has not changed. That which is now being defended in Bolivia is a mining model under strong state control, and within this context, a developmentalist model based on the export of primary resources is the same as the one in the rest of the continent. Under Morales' rule, mining exports doubled in profit from previous similar periods. And even given these results, the Bolivian state intends to increase the figures. With this aim in mind, it plans to sanction a new mining law in 2010. Up until now, the debates previous to the writing of this law, do not specifically refer to the extraction method in relation to the environment. However, the government's attitude to environmental claims seems to suggest that Bolivia could be on the brink of betraying the indigenous principle of "good living", which brought Evo Morales to power: the right of indigenous communities to have a balanced relationship with their space and time.

None of the governments of the so-called progressive trend in Latin America has seriously questioned the extractivist model. In Ecuador's new constitution, approved in 2008, the pressure applied by the indigenous movements managed, for the first time in history, to identify nature as a subject with its own rights. However, in January of 2009, the parliament passed a mining law which authorised open-pit extraction and which provided transnational corporations with specific guarantees. In Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, where the "21st Century socialism" model was established and where the vague Bolivarian revolution is taking place, the main basis of the national economy is oil export.

Up until now the Latin American states have not managed to consolidate the alternative model which some of their presidents brag about in International forums. The developmentalist model follows the notion of a western paradise, which either rejects or stratifies any form of life which is by its immanent nature impulsive and in continuous creation. In the case of mega mining, the notion of *extraction* as generative not only of capital, but most importantly of all, of meaning, is realised with geographical voraciousness, lacking any kind of human input, even hate or greed. Those who for the past six centuries have been suffering the consequences of continuous looting of their resources, and refuse to disappear, do indeed know about other worlds, other ways of living: the indigenous communities, and small farmers. The true owners of the land.

⁹ <http://www.americaeconomia.com/> (30 October 2009)

This essay was written by Gabriela Massuh for “The Potosí Principle” in 2009. In the exhibition catalog, we were only able to publish a Spanish version. For the archive, we asked Rosa Nogues to produce an English translation. We asked Gabriela ten years later if she wanted to add or change anything in the essay. No, she said, nothing has changed.

On October 15th and 16th, 2010, a conference was held at the Hebbel Theater in Berlin, entitled “Latin America’s Colonial Memory” and organized by Julia Roth and Gabriela Massuh. This was one of the first events on issues that would keep all of us involved and interested in political discourse occupied for a long time: Neoextractivism and *Buen Vivir*. Those who participated in the conference did not yet correspond with the discursive nomenclature that would subsequently determine this field. They were activists, artists, and theorists who were closely linked to social struggles in South America at the time. For us, this conference served as a role model, but at the same time it pointed to a blind spot inside the “Principio Potosí” project. We had never explicitly dealt with the topics in the project, although they were so urgently obvious.

The conference took place six days after the opening of our exhibition at the House of World Cultures in Berlin. Why did we neglect, forget, why didn’t we manage to link our exhibition and this event, even though Gabriela had told us about it? We can say we were too exhausted or too busy organizing the exhibition. On the other hand, we remember the panels that we made it to in the first days after the opening – they were little visited, occupied by equally exhausted artists and some perplexed theorists. I remember how in a panel about drug policy the courier from Chuchulaya intervened, giving practical instructions how to place the coca leaves in your cheek, how to chew them slowly, what salt is required to increase their effect, etc. – and the silence after that, since his instruction came from another, completely different world. I felt as if these instructions made everything we were talking about seem wrong and helpless.

Since then we haven’t organized any conversation formats. They have now become part of the protocol for exhibitions with discursive aspirations. I do not wish to denounce these formats as wrong or helpless. They represent the constant effort to find ‘a path to the neighbor’s house’. Perhaps it is this helplessness that indicates certain dead ends that are characteristic for institutions, for their languages and rituals, for a certain exhaustion that’s happening in panel discussions and talks and is making them politically senseless. But that does not deny the possibilities underlying all these efforts – and this archive, too – where being wrong might belong to an ambivalent experience that wishes to be affection but needs to become effective as separation. But how is one supposed to be affected, if not over a distance? Any other way would remain self-centered.

Meetings like the one held at the Hebbel Theater are rare occurrences. They make this distance obvious, and at the same time operational.

Language
Exhausted
With the tired mouth
On the endless path
To the neighbor’s house

1 Gabriela Massuh, Los verdaderos dueños de la tierra o el desmadre de la minería en América Latina, p. 238 ff
in: How Can We Sing the Song of the Lord in an Alien Land? The Potosí Principle
ed. by Alice Creischer, Max Jorge Hinderer, Andreas Siekmann, Walther König, Cologne 2010

2 Latin America's Colonial Memory. From the end of resources as we know them
Hebbel am Ufer Theater (HAU3), organizer: Goethe-Institut, Buenos Aires; Hebbel am Ufer Theater (HAU), Berlin; Federal
Agency for Civic Education, October 15, 2010 - October 16, 2010

3 The long Memory of Cocaine, John Barker, Max Jorge Hinderer, Working Days, October 8/9, 2010, House of World
Cultures

4 The colonial paintings were accompanied by couriers, who paid attention to their careful hanging. The painting "Virgen de
Chuchlaya" was accompanied by a courier from the village.

5 Sprache
abgehetzt
mit dem müden Mund
auf dem endlosen Weg
zum Hause des Nachbarn

Translation in, Clark Blaise, World Story, Ontario, 1940
Johannes Bobrowski, Sprache, in: Wetterzeichen. Gedichte. Berlin: Union-Verlag, 1966

Translated with deep
Proofreading Clemens Krümmel

Mining model, social resistance and imaginaries of development in Argentina

Maristella Svampa, Hebbel Theatre am Ufer, Berlin, October, 2010,

A highly discriminatory model: open-pit mega-mining - The history of the extractivist paradigm in Latin America is long and sombre, shaped by the establishment of colonial enclaves that are highly destructive to local economies and which are directly linked to the enslavement and impoverishment of the local population. Nevertheless, despite the fact that both exploitation and exportation of natural goods are not new activities in our region, it is clear that in the last years of the 20th Century, within the context of a changing model of accumulation, the increase in projects based on controlling, extracting and exporting natural resources on a large scale has clearly intensified.

In terms of economic relations, the fact of globalisation outlined a new International division of labour which further intensified the existing asymmetries between core countries and those in the periphery. And so, countries of the North overall tend to transfer the first stages of extractive activity – even including the first stages of the process – outside of its borders, privileging the wellbeing of the local environment at the expense of greater damage to the global environment – especially that of the countries in the global South whose land is used both as a source of natural resources, and as a waste dumping ground.

Consequently, the present stage presents a gradually greater demand of raw materials and consumer goods by developed countries on dependent countries. This is then reflected in the consolidation of an extractivist productive model, based on the over-exploitation of natural resources and the expansion of the industrial frontier towards areas that were previously considered “unproductive”: open pit mega-mining, land privatisation, the construction of mega-dams, an agrobusiness boom based on the production of genetically modified produce and direct seeding, infrastructure projects planned by the IIRSA, and the so-called bio-fuels, all of the above perfectly illustrate the new division of land and labour between North and South on the global scale, within the context of the current capitalist model. This has obvious consequences in terms of the “unequal distribution of ecological conflicts” (M. Alier, 2004) and land related conflicts. This meteoric process of reconfiguration of the land extends from Mexico all the way to the furthest South end of the continent, in Argentina and Chile, and hurts mostly the areas most removed from the big urban centres, small and medium sized towns, as well as vast semi-isolated territories, in many cases populated by originary peoples, as in the case of the Amazon. It is no coincidence that one of the consequences of this new development has been the intensification of ancestral struggles for land by indigenous and farmers’ movements, as well as the emergence of new forms of citizen mobilisation and participation aimed at the defence of natural resources (defined as the “commons”), biodiversity and the environment. Far from any kind of linearity, this new situation gradually introduces in the different Latin American governments – and especially in those that are centre-left of left leaning – new tensions and conflicts, and sometimes real dilemmas and obvious contradictions, in terms of the conflict between the struggle for the defence of the land and the territory, in the name of “the commons”, and on the other hand, the reinforcement of productive models which are aimed at the external market, in the name of a neo-developmental discourse, based on extractivism. A paradigmatic case of this is open pit mega-mining. Let us then take a look at the characteristics of this model.

Up until not very long ago there were in Latin America only four countries with a significant mining tradition: Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Mexico. However, the industrial reform of the 1990s introduced

mining into countries that were previously not “traditionally” mining orientated, such as Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela, Honduras and Guatemala. In line with this, most of the Latin American countries involved implemented in the 1990s a total reform of their regulatory framework, in order to provide the big transnational corporations with ample profit margins. The said reform was supported by various International agencies (the World Bank and IDB, among others), in order to facilitate, promote and guarantee the new mining boom in the area.

Due to the exploitation possibilities that new technology offers, Argentina has at present come to occupy the sixth place in the world in terms of mining potential. A number of reports confirm that 75% of land susceptible to mining has not yet been subjected to prospective drilling. The accumulated growth of mining projects is even more unbelievable: it increased by 907% in five years, reaching in 2008 over 400 projects, which were at different levels of development, and not all of them employing open pit mining methods.

It is important at this stage to clarify the type of mining that we are referring to when we speak of new mining or open pit mega-mining. Even if the economic consequences can be equated, we are actually very far away from the shaft mining industry of old times, when metals could be found in large seams, from the depths of underground passages. Very few countries, including Bolivia, still rely on traditional mining, and this is largely based on tin and small-scale extraction. A fundamental factor explains the transition from traditional to modern mining methods, and that is the progressive exhaustion at world level of seams of high grade metals. This means that, given the decrease in the content of a specific mineral in rocks, shaft mining exploitation ceases to be profitable. Open pit mining exploitation uses a lixiviation process, which is precisely the type of technology that today allows for the extraction of minerals disseminated in the carrier rock. Mountains are blown up with dynamite to move great quantities of rock. Steps are then built which result in the “open pit”. As a consequence of this method, the quantity of rock that is moved far exceeds the quantity of rock that is directly used, thus increasing and intensifying the damage inflicted on the environment, to which we can add the environmental harm produced by the residues.

We must also consider the excessive use of resources – fundamentally water and energy – within this context of the significant level of environmental damage that results from open-pit mining. Both water and energy are essential for the development of these types of mining exploitation projects. Water, the main element in the extraction process, is taken from nearby rivers, glaciers and aquifers at a rate of a few hundred or thousand litres per second. It is for this reason that mining exploitation projects are located at the source of water basins and close to fossil water reserves. Secondly, we are discussing metal mega-mining, that is to say, large scale mining projects aimed at the extraction of gold, silver, copper and other strategic minerals. The use of resources is in these cases greater, and therefore, so is the economic and socio-environmental impact. And so, mining corporations’ environmental impact reports tend to minimise the fact that this type of mining industry is in direct competition with other local economic activities (land and livestock farming) for the same natural resources (land and water). To cite one example in the case of water, the mining site Bajo La Alumbrera, located in the Northeast of Argentina, one of the largest mining ventures in Latin America, uses 1,200 litres of water per second (around 100 million litres a day) in what is actually a desert area. The water is extracted from a natural reserve of fossil water (Machado Aráoz, 2009: 209). In addition, according to recent data, this site is consuming the equivalent of 25% of all the energy of the Northeast region, which includes no less than four Argentinian provinces.

Thirdly, if the socio-environmental damage is clearly high and situates us already at the centre of an extractivist paradigm, highly questioned from very different perspectives (political ecology, indigenous movements, social economy), we also need to add that we are far from witnessing the expansion of a “national” development model. In the paradigmatic cases of Argentina and Peru, territorial expansion and control of the new open pit mega-mining industry is, due to the prevailing regulatory framework sanctioned in the 1990s, exclusively in the hands of large transnational

corporations. Even in a country such as Chile, the mining industry has undergone a process of de-nationalisation under law 19137. It was instanced by the centre-left (CPD) government, that the transfer to private hands of the Codelco digging sites – which were not yet being exploited – was carried out (Quevedo et al, 2002).

...

Fourthly, large scale mining projects tend to combine a multi-scale approach and a *typology of the site*, which is very frequent in Latin America's history and is inextricably linked to the extractive model.¹ The economic weight of these companies is such that the fact that corporate interests not only supersede but replace the state, minimising and/or abusing citizens' decision making power, is not surprising. The implementation process of the extractive model is therefore linked to repressive and authoritarian policies which criminalise poverty and social protest. This is clear in the case of Peru (Palacin Quispe, 2008, De Echave et al, 2009b), and it is beginning to take shape in Argentina, with a politics of criminalisation and repression of socio-environmental protest.

Lastly, it is worth clarifying that despite the bombastic corporate statements, we are far from a "socially responsible" mining industry. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is clearly part of a larger context, which aims at establishing and legitimising the new extractivist model. In public, corporations play at developing close links with institutions, private and public universities, through agreements and subsidies. At the same time they generate intense advertising campaigns in many and different media, within a framework that emphasises the "responsible mining" angle. In private, the effects of the industry in the communities within which the extractive projects are located are even greater. The focalised nature of the mining industry's projects, and the infrastructure they generate, introduce significant changes in the communities.

Within this given context, open pit mega-mining clearly constitutes an extreme case, the brutal manifestation of the dynamic of dispossession, within which the crude logic of economic plundering and environmental predation is combined with regional political contexts determined by a huge power imbalance.

In summary, within this context, indigenous farming communities and the new movements against open pit mega-mining are aware that they have been thrown into a playing field difficult to contest, and with clearly asymmetrical power positions. Adversaries gradually consolidate a heavily articulated framework, with complex and multiplying effects, aiming at the legitimisation of the new mining model. And so, the hegemonic model is enforced via the abuse of the population's legitimate rights – including indigenous populations' territorial rights, recognised in all kinds of international treaties and part of various constitutions –, the destruction of archeological patrimony, the establishment of exploitation sites in protected areas, and all kinds of disciplining strategies – including the abuse of citizens' decision-making processes – which either silence the population and stop or hinder the possibility of developing popular consultation processes within the affected communities, or aim to revoke proscription laws already approved.

...

3 - The eco-territorial turn of the struggle

Socio-environmental struggles today belong to the register of a "popular ecology" redefined as the "ideology and practice of popular struggles for the conservation of natural resources within the sphere of a moral economy, as well as the defence in scientific terms of the value of biodiversity, and the reasonable use of the material and energy resources, avoiding an unwarranted hope in future technologies" (Martinez Allier, 2009: 5). They tend to situate themselves, albeit not exclusively, within a context that promotes a redefinition of the rules of the game stemming from a radical problematisation of the development model and the logic of accumulation.

In this sense, the new cartography of resistance is setting the grounds for an eco-territorial turn, which reflects the convergence of indigenous-communitarian struggles and the language of

environmentalism, establishing an ample space in which the struggles of farmers' movements, indigenous populations and new socio-environmental movements gradually come together.

The result of this manifold confluence is the reinforcement of a *language of value* about the territories that opposes, in many cases radically, the eco-efficiency-based discourse and the developmentalist basis of the dominant narrative. This different language of value in relation to territoriality seems to be more immediate for the indigenous and farming communities, given, on the one hand, the close links between land and territory established by these – in terms of a community of life – and on the other, the well known reactivation of the indigenous community matrix observed in the past few decades. Nevertheless, the eco-territorial turn is not limited to the rural sphere and neither does it refer solely to resistance by the farming and indigenous communities. It extends to the urban sphere as well, especially in small- and mid-sized towns, thus expanding the class register, and consequently, the type of actors involved.

We can summarise the eco-territorial turn today in terms of four main themes:¹

Eco-territorial turn and the commons:

On a first instance, due to the defence of natural resources, these are resignified as “the commons” which guarantee and support forms of life in a specific territory. From within the context of the eco-territorial turn, there are three pillars that support – in terms of experience – this language about territory. They coexist, giving shape to the movement, and producing moments of tension and at the same time of potentiality: we are hereby referring to the defence struggles that invoke different modes of living and experiencing the land, be it as an “inherited territory”, a “chosen territory, and/or an “originary territory”.

The struggle for the respect of forms of life at a local level then produce mobilisations in urban and rural areas where their inhabitants perceive these commons as threatened. In some cases, the land is understood in relation to the family, to the community or even to an ancestral history (“inherited territory”), among other. In other cases, the struggle involves those who, having chosen to abandon the country's great urban centres, have settled in land which is today under threat. We are referring to individuals from the medium-level sector, some of them professionals, who are motivated by the pursue of a better quality of life, as well as young people who have opted for a different lifestyle based on a close relationship between “the natural” and the environment. In other cases, the notion of an “inherited” territory and/or a “chosen” territory, converges with the idea of one's own territory, which is the case of the indigenous and farming communities (“originary territory”). And yet, whichever the case may be, what is at stake here is a struggle between the rights to the land on the one hand and the economic interests of the corporations involved and the political authorities on the other. Thus, it is not just a conflict about “natural resources”, but a battle for the construction of a specific “type of territoriality” (Port Gonçalves, 2001). The defence of one's own land sometimes imbues these struggles with a localist character, which at times introduces friction in relationship to frameworks critical of the hegemonic model of development and the consequences of the globalised reproduction of capital, and at others complements them.

Eco-territorial turn and the environmental justice movement:

The eco-territorial turn shares significant points of contact with what those involved call the “environmental justice movement”, which emerged in the 1980s in the black communities of the United States. This movement, which has extended to other countries, posits that the notion of environmental justice “implies the right to a safe, healthy and productive environment for all, where the latter is considered in its totality, including its ecological, physical, built, social, political, aesthetic and economic dimensions. It thus refers to the conditions that allow for such a right to be freely exercised, thereby preserving, respecting and fully realising the individual and group identities, and the dignity and autonomy of the community” (Acselard: 16). And hence, the coming together of social justice and environmentalism results in a conception of human beings not as separate from the environment, but rather as a fundamental part of the real environment (Di Chiro, 1998). This perspective, which highlights the inequality in environmental damage; the lack of participation and

democracy; the racism against the indigenous communities, stripped of their land in the name of unsustainable projects; and of course, the gender injustice and the environmental debt; is at the root of several environmental justice networks in Latin America today, in countries such as Chile (OLCA in Spanish, Latin-American Laboratory for Environmental Conflicts) and Brazil (Environmental Justice Network).¹

Eco-territorial turn and the rights of nature:

This perspective defends the intrinsic value of nature and presents itself as different from those frameworks which include environmental issues within third generation citizens' rights. It was put forward by the Uruguayan Eduardo Gudynas (2009b, 2010), who proposes a dissociation of the rights of nature, with the latter at its centre, from human rights, which are based on the human being. We can find a good illustration of this discursive and philosophical approach which recognises nature as a subject with its own rights, in the new constitution of Ecuador, and more specifically, within what Gudynas (2009b) has called the "biocentric turn", which differentiates it from hegemonic anthropocentric positions. And so, new types of citizenship are hereby also proposed (environmental citizenship and ecological meta-citizenship), or two types of independent justice systems, *environmental justice*, which demands fair and just social conditions as well as a healthy and unpolluted environment, and an *ecological justice*, which centres on the survival of species and their ecosystems as life networks (Gudynas, 2009a, Acosta, 2010).¹

Eco-territorial turn and good living:

One of the ideas at the centre of the current eco-territorial turn, and the one that seems to provide it with the most vitality, is that of *good living*, *sumaj kausay* or *suma kamaña*, closely linked to the indigenous Andean cosmivision. There is no doubt that this is an idea that resonates and is most capable of mobilising people. It functions as a kind of emancipatory horizon that privileges drawing bridges between the past and the future, between the community matrix and an ecological gaze.

Having said that, what meaning does "good living" have within the contemporary debates that are taking place especially in Ecuador and Bolivia? According to the Ecuadorian Ana Maria Larrea, it is a "concept under construction" (2010). For the Bolivian Xavier Albo (2009), we can find behind this concept the logic of many indigenous communities, juxtaposed to the dominant societies and powers, and their way of forming part of a country. This eco-communitarian perspective is represented by the Bolivian councillor David Choquehuanca himself, an aymara intellectual with a long trajectory in the world of NGOs. He put it in the following terms:

We defined our goals when *good living* was included in the new political constitution. When we used to get together in 1990 and 1992, the aymaras used to say that we "wanted to be again, because we had not ceased to be; we did not want to just be, but rather, we wanted to be again". What does this mean? We want to be *camiris* again. *Camiri* is a person who lives well; the words rich and poor don't exist in their language. Quechuas have said "we want to be *kapac* again". *Kapac* is a person who lives well. And guaranis have said "we want to be *iyambae* again". *Iyambae*: a person who moves according to the laws of nature, not the laws made by humans. That is why we refer to *living well* (Choquehuanca, 2009).

According to the Ecuadorian Magdalena Leon, the concept of "good living" is based "on reciprocity, cooperation, complementarity" and implies a shift in our principles, from accumulation, to life. We are thus in the face of an idea that places a specific balance in the given conditions, in order to allow for the reproduction of social life. In addition, the author links "good living" with an eco-feminist perspective on life care, and care of the other (Leon, 2009).

Two Latin-American countries, Ecuador and Bolivia, have incorporated the discourse of "good living" into their constitutions. In Ecuador, the main goal is to counteract the hegemonic model of development, and in Bolivia, the idea of "good living" is established as an aspiration in opposition to the dominant Western world view. Moreover, it is significant that while in Ecuador the concept of "good living" is supported by a long philosophical lineage (covering Aristotle all the way to eco-

socialism and eco-feminism), in Bolivia, on the other hand, where the political process is more self-centred, “good living” is linked to the indigenous world view.

At present, the idea of “good living” constitutes a vast area of thought and practice, over which different emancipatory projects are being inscribed. Within these, the notion of community appears as a framework of inspiration and a common kernel, well beyond the difficulties of attempting to translate it into particular experiences (in order to avoid idealising the indigenous community context as well as ignoring the various manifestations of community in Latin America), or into specific public policies (where the main threat is its early voiding on meaning and effect at the hands of governmental rhetoric, and their potential “vampirisation” by International agencies, as it has already happened with other ideas of great political promise).

The eco-territorial turn is symptomatic of an emerging conflict between private interests, represented by the big transnational corporations, in their alliance with the various governments, and the rights of the communities and peoples, safeguarded by International laws, as well as by the different national constitutions, especially in the case of new political constitutions drawn up by governments such as is the case in Bolivia and in Ecuador. Whether it is couched in the language of the defence of human rights or that of the rights of nature, the demand points towards a democratisation of the decision making process, and moreover, towards the rights of the community to say “NO” to projects which are going to greatly affect their living conditions as well as compromise the future of generations. The latter constitutes a true breaking point for current governments.

In Peru, as Bebbington (2009) points out, various environmental movements coexist with difficulty. These range from the demand for economic reparations all the way to the total rejection of the model of development. In opposition to this, in Argentina, the eco-territorial turn is aimed at the defence of land and territory, and it has quickly appropriated the language of human rights and the defence of the commons. This has been clearly shown recently in the campaign for the defence of the glacier protection law, which was a campaign based on the defence of water as a common good.

Revisiting the different imaginaries of development

In the last few years, the epochal shift that has taken place in Latin America has come to give shape to a transitional stage determined by two main ideas: on the one hand, the actualisation of the national-popular matrix, and on the other, the expansion of a “neo-developmental” model with extractivism at its basis (Gudynas, 2009; Svampa, 2009a). The very rapid growth of the extractivist-export model and the large scale IIRSA¹ backed infrastructure projects, certainly seem to have introduced a certain “developmentalist illusion”, given that, as opposed to the decade of the 1990s, Latin American economies have greatly benefitted from the high prices of primary products (commodities) in the International market. This was reflected in the last few years in the commercial trade balances and fiscal surplus. This fact cannot be dismissed, especially after the long period of stagnation and economic regression of the last few decades. In this favourable conjuncture (at least before the current world financial crisis erupted), quite a few Latin American governments have considered that in depth discussions about the question of development was a secondary issue, and sometimes something to avoid altogether. In lieu of it they have encouraged and reinforced a return to a productivist perspective.

...

¹ Among the adopted measures, we can highlight the following: fiscal and exchange rate stability for thirty years from the presentation of the project, exemption from paying import right tariffs, income tax deductions on 100% of the investment, the discoverer of the site is exempt from paying the fee for three years, customs tariff and tax exemptions, exemption from paying presumed minimal income tax and mining property tax, corporations are exempt from paying export taxes. To this list of tax exemptions, they added the non-obligation to exchange foreign currency into the country's currency. In terms of exploitation right payments, a maximum contribution of 3% on the value of the mine as declared by the corporation (and after deducting the costs involved in the process from extraction to its transport for export) was established.

² Article 124 in the National Constitution points out that "the provinces have control over the natural resources in their territory".

³ Site economies are understood here as those economies that transfer resources to extraterritorial agents without then generating relevant economic links within the territory itself.

⁴ The conflict with the Canadian mining corporation Meridian Gold took place within a national context at that time determined by a great social effervescence. Following in the steps of the event in Tambogrande, Peru, the self-convened residents of Esquel organised a plebiscite on 23 March 2003, which delivered a clear "no" to the mine (81%).

⁵ *escrache* is a term (mainly used in Argentina, but increasingly in other Spanish-speaking countries) given to a small-scale demonstration, in which a group of activists demonstrate in front of the home or workplace of a particular person, whose crimes/corruption they want to denounce, in order to draw the media's attention to this figure. They originally targeted ex-torturers from the military dictatorship, but today they are carried out against politicians and other public figures. [TN]

⁶ For a first version of this systematisation, see Svampa and Alvarez (2010).

⁷ See <http://www.olca.cl/oca/justicia/justicia02.htm> y www.justicaambiental.org.br/_justicaambiental

⁸ A further element which converges with these, albeit at different levels of intensity depending on the different territories, is a spiritual conception of nature, which imbues the latter with a *sacred* character. This position is similar to the movement defined by Arne Naess (1984) at its origin as "profound environmentalism" and which has been more influential in certain parts of Europe and in the United States. From within this perspective the emphasis is on the natural world as deserving of the same right to life as human beings, given that it is not conceived of as a mere instrument for the pursuit of other ends (the satisfaction of human rights and desires, the regulation and reproduction of the global ecological system, etc.), but rather as a being with inherent rights and value. Within this framework, no natural object is understood as solely a resource. Naess claims that when we argue on the basis of deep ecological premises, most of the proposed complex technological solutions don't even need to be discussed, given that "the relative merits of the alternative technological proposals don't make any sense when our vital needs have already been covered." On the other hand, it is worth clarifying that this perspective has not been influenced by specific religions or philosophies, but rather, "the most important participants are artists and writers who don't articulate their position in terms of a professional philosophy, but in their art and poetry" (Naess, 1984).

⁹ Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America

Slaughter

He came down to Sucre from Tarija and then went up to La Paz. Here, dazzled by myriads of hats and different attires, he dressed up in aymara clothes. He exchanged two nights of sex for a hotel, and settled into the twenty-first floor, with the city at his feet. He bought a black woollen *unku*¹ in the market and wrapped himself in it, and then he got a red *waka*² to fasten it at the waist. He disappeared into the crowd in El Alto, and, keeping his credit card safe, extended a blanket on the floor of a muddy side street. He propped a barely readable sign: I will exchange my body for one night for a lift to Cuzco. He spent there two days and their two nights. But no one looked at him, it was as though they weren't taking notice of his offer. One particular evening, at dusk, at that precise time of the day when the cold air settles onto the ground like a frozen carapace, he noticed a *cholita*³ who was carrying her child in a woollen baby sling. She was talking non-stop on her mobile phone, it seemed as though she was arguing about a particular transaction. The image was so paradoxical that he stared as if entranced. The *cholita* was focussed on her never-ending conversation, gesturing as if her life depended on it. Until she finally hung up. She adjusted her belongings and when she was about to go, she lowered her head and looked Topo in the eyes. She said very seriously:

- Look, Mr or Mrs, whatever you are, you are too beautiful to be selling your body in exchange for travel. Right here, in the terminal, we have good and cheap vehicles that can take you wherever you please.

Topo felt embarrassed. He wanted to say something back, but she leaned forward, adjusted the baby into the sling with a small jump and left with determined pace.

He decided to follow the *cholita*'s orders. He went to the bus terminal and bought a ticket for just a few coins. The bus was filled to the brim with people carrying all kinds of things, with animals and with European backpackers. He travelled for hours on his feet, leaning against two people who were sleeping under a heap of children and bags. He recognised the same odour that he had smelled in the ranches of the indigenous population in Tarija: an acid smell of wool, soil, ferment and *acullico*⁴. Before arriving at the border with Peru, the bus followed the route of the Titicaca lake and travelled through the cities of Laja, Tihuanaku and Guaqui.

Before going through passport control, Topo, at that moment dressed as a Bolivian *chola*, decided to dress up as a city dweller. For this, the passport said that he was a man. The border agents, surlier than those in Bolivia, looked at him suspiciously; they asked him if his moustache was real. But Topo, an expert in commanding respect when the going got tough, played the ruffian, and pulled faces like a pretty Buenos Aires boy, something which annoyed the agents even more. They pulled him away from the queue and took him to a room where he was subjected to a thorough body and luggage search. They did not know what to do with him. Topo was treating them as if they were close friends, something which confused the guards even further. He won them over through sheer fatigue. Confused by the slippery nature of his character, they decided to believe him and ended up thinking that Argentina produced increasingly exotic people. They could never make any sense of things. Topo realised that in Peru the issue of his particular use of dress and adornment was not going to be easily tolerated. His performance was so perfect that when he got on the bus again, the driver did not recognise the previous *chola* and made a passenger, who was sitting by the window at the front of the bus, leave his seat for Topo, as if the latter was someone special.

When the bus was near Puno, it drove along a small corniche, a cliffside road on the edge of gigantic mountains of farmed terraces. The boldness of the landscape, the blinding colourful nature of the terraces, with multiple hues of green according to the different heights and types of crop, provoked rushes of happiness in Topo. He could not stop smiling, and occasionally he would burst into laughter making everyone on the bus ill at ease. This masterpiece of agricultural engineering would be etched in his memory for the rest of his life. He did not tire of looking, or more precisely, of admiring and revering such a wonder of work which extended beyond Cuzco into the Sacred Valley. He noticed that the farming terraces experimented with different design patterns: circles, trapezoids, rectangles and squares, in order to facilitate the reproduction of the farmed plant species under different climatic conditions. The terraces, with fences made of solid rock, were at different angles in relation to the sun. Depending on their height and their inclination, they were hit by different light wavelengths, which affected the various crops differently, according to their type and habitat. He read in Wikipedia, which in those days he checked constantly, that the terraces "constituted genuine agrobiological laboratories for the production of various


crops.” One of the commenters claimed that they were “planters that were built over the years. In order to prepare them for farming it was necessary to turn over the existing soil and bring fertile soil from elsewhere”. At the same time he also warned against the romanticisation that this type of agricultural engineering elicited: “the world is not the same anymore, today a lot of people need to be fed. And so, in order to avoid mass hunger, the so-called green revolution’s agroindustrial single crop farming method is the best option today.” He speaks just like the foreman, Topo thought to himself. And he felt a sudden urge to cut the commenter’s throat. As well as the foreman’s.

He stayed in Cuzco for several days, but not in order to visit Machu Pichu, but rather, to wander inside the different churches. He witnessed the hellish machinery of Christianity, the colonisation of the indigenous population through pious images from Europe which they then copied, carefully moulded by the central power as the exclusive marketing for salvation. He was dead scared of the arquebusier angels due to their beauty and cruelty, painted in the attire of the soldiers of the empire, dressed up to the nines for the killing of *indios*. It was said that they were venerated by the indigenous population because they recognised in these winged creatures, their own gods and heroes. He had already seen them in a Bolivian church in Calamarca, close to La Paz, and since then, he had looked for them eagerly, and angrily, fascinated by the idea that death could also acquire a celestial investiture. Death would be sweet if it arrived huddled behind strawberry trees and glitter, sweet as honey, sweet as hell, sweet as a withheld caress.

He remained in Cuzco in order to embark on a lonely pilgrimage through the Sacred Valley, the centre of the Inca empire, the most magnificent terrace construction in the world. He slept in the old dismantled *tambos*, the typical lodges on the old Tahuantisuyo roads. He shielded himself from the cold with a thick sheep skin which he picked up in the market in Chinchero. During his journey on foot he realised with horror that these constructions looked similar to the craters that are left today by the open pit mining industry. America’s sentence, and it is not exclusive to America: previously, a fertile soil, loved and cared for so that it could provide fruit, venerated as the goddess of all gods. Today, a barren land, covered in sterile lunar craters, devastated by dynamite, flooded with cyanide, and dead for all eternity within the confines of a perpetual state of conquest. The end of time. What did one human death signify compared to the death of creation? What does human death mean when that which makes life itself possible is destroyed? Topo’s thoughts and feelings spiralled into a growing rage which choked his insides. The terraces were first agriculture, and then Greek theatres of the Classical age. Today they can be seen from a plane as the symbol of the planet’s destruction.

He descended into the wet lands. He walked the three thousand hectares of the Huamantanga forests, he sailed through the Chinchaycocha lake, heavily polluted from the tailings of the mines in Cerro de Pasco. He rowed in the streams of the high jungle in the Peruvian Amazon, and fell in love with its rainforests, which extend to the Oriental Andean foothills. He fed on fish, fern, small reptiles and phanerogams, which, according to Wikipedia, were nutritious flower plants. He reached the communal reserve of Amarakaeri, where he found out that one of its political districts was that of Fiscarrald, part of the Madre de dios region. Its residents still remembered the rumbling blond god, the main character in a film where a boat crawled through the jungle for no apparent reason, with the only aim of satisfying the film’s director’s ambitions. Celluloid heroism, the arrogance of thundering Jupiter, mad conquistadors before the astonished naked *indios*, terrified to the bone of the howling viking.

And finally he left via the city of Jaen in order to return to Lima, crossdressed as himself, if that is ever possible. He knew: that through which he had had to live during the last few months and years, whether beautiful wonders or disasters, were an infinitesimal part of the structure of the origin that he had been searching for. From Lima he planned on travelling along the coast to the north. Yet when he began to receive a dim signal on his mobile phone, and once he connected to the internet, it exploded with news. One of them startled him. Lola had written to him to inform him that his mother was in hospital. When he read: “reserved prognosis” he bought a plane ticket. The trip had come to an end.



Translation Notes:

I am using the masculine for Topo to stay true to the original (“nadie lo miraba”, “miró al Topo”, “viajó parado”, etc). From this short extract, it is clear that Topo’s gender is ambiguous and non binary, shifting from male to female clothing. As I am not familiar with the whole novel I have decided to stay close to the original on this one. One way to emphasize the non binary nature of Topo’s gender in English would be to use the pronoun they/their/them

¹ An *unku* is a type of Inca tunic (traditionally ceremonial), made from a single piece of cloth.

² A *waka* is a thin belt made of cloth with a metal buckle.

³ *Chola/cholita* was originally a derogatory term to refer to women of mixed Spanish and Indigenous ancestry. Today, in Bolivia, the term has lost this deprecatory connotation and is used as a symbol of Indigenous identity and power.

⁴ *Acullico* is a small ball made out of coca leaves, usually mixed in with quinoa ash and boiled potato. It is chewed to extract the juice, which has a stimulating effect.

Eight Questions to Gabriela Massuh and Maristella Svampa, on what has changed since 2008

Berlin, December 2018

1. We are especially interested in the extent to which the crisis has made extractivism dynamic since the year 2008. We see 2008 as a time when enrichment received a tremendous boost, in which Capital sought new investment opportunities. Do you agree with that?

Maristella Svampa: In Latin America, we rather use the term “neoextractivism.” This is done in order to differentiate the present situation from the historical extractive model which began with the conquest of America and later gained ground with the development and exploitation of the Potosí mines, and which is associated with the expansion of capital, conquest, and genocide. From those early days onwards, the land in Latin America has been a hunting ground for destruction and looting. Due to the fact that the region is so rich in natural resources, its territories have undergone constant reconfigurations in relation to the expansion of the commodity frontier that is shaped by the different economic cycles and imposed by the logic of capital. The consequences of this reordering has been, on a local scale, a great contrast between extraordinary profitability and extreme poverty, as well as a great loss of human life and an immense degradation of the land, which has become a sacrificial site. Potosí, in Bolivia, marks the emergence of a process based on the large-scale appropriation of nature, as well as of a mode of accumulation rooted in the export of raw materials and determined by a form of subordinate insertion into the world economy. Internal specialization and external dependency gradually established what the Venezuelan author Fernando Coronil has accurately termed “nature-exporting societies.”

The history of extractivism in the region is not linear.¹ It is continuously intersected by successive economic cycles, which themselves depend on the demands of the world market, as well as by the various processes of consolidation of the national state – especially in the mid-Twentieth Century – which allowed for a specific control of the enormous profits that both mining and oil yielded.

And yet, at the start of the 21st Century, extractivism has acquired new dimensions. It is within this context, where we can identify both continuities and ruptures, that the concept reappears as a “neoextractivism”. The mentioned continuities are rooted in the fact that extractivism’s DNA – which European capital imposed on the long-term memory of the region – fed, with the help of the different consecutive economic cycles, a specific social imaginary about nature and its virtues. As a consequence, extractivism was associated not only to the large-scale pillage and plundering of natural resources, but also to the comparative advantages and financial opportunities which emerged under the umbrella of the various economic cycles and the role that the state played within them. It was not a coincidence that, aided by the different progressive governments, neoextractivism managed to implant and reinforce yet again the developmentalist illusion, built around the idea that, owing to the opportunities opened up by the new commodities boom, and moreover, to the proactive attitude of state, development could actually be achieved.

The characteristic feature of this new phase of capital accumulation, whose beginning coincided with the end of the second millennium, is the pressure that is exerted on natural resources and territories, as well as the rapid expansion of the commodity frontier. As a consequence, new political, social and environmental disputes broke out, as well as forms of social resistance which had been unthinkable within the hegemonic developmentalist imaginary. New instances of collective action emerged, which questioned the developmentalist illusion at the same time that they denounced the imposition of a model geared towards single crop farming, a farming practice that destroys biodiversity, leads to land hoarding and ruins the land.

Coming back to your initial question, neoextractivism is linked to the global economic crisis, inasmuch as the new model of accumulation is the result of the various financial reforms introduced by neoliberal capitalism from the 1990s onwards, and then reinforced with the 2008 financial crisis. On the one hand, the financial sector plays a fundamental role in the projects of extraction of raw materials, as well as in the organization of the logistics of their distribution. And last but not least, it is key in determining the commodity prices' rises and falls on the International stock markets. On the other hand, the crisis has deepened social inequalities by means of a politics of financial austerity enforced by the "core countries." This made economic models based on the intense commodification of nature more desirable as an alternative to fight recession. And so, the core countries promoted the so-called "Inclusive Green Economy" model, in order to extend the financial format of the coal market to other natural resources: air, water, and other natural processes and elements.

Gabriela Massuh: A strange legal figure sanctioned in the new Civil and Trade Code of Argentina, in force since 2015, has contributed to putting pressure on small farmers. I am referring to the "right to surface use," a legal device that allows landowners to rent their land to a third party and provide them with the right to commercially exploit soil, subsoil and air space.² In order to attract investors (both foreign and national) the new Code made use of all kinds of rules to guarantee the investors' "legal protection". Once more, just as it happened years ago with Menem, extractive activity was declared of "public interest" in order to prevent its expropriation. With the figure of the "superficiary", the surface rights holder, the landowner ceases to have any control over the transformations of the territory. This figure allows the farmer landowner to "rent" the land's subsoil to an extractive corporation which hereby indirectly takes control of the surface and the air space as well. The Civil Code's reform added a new division and made it threefold, adding the air space to the surface and the subsoil. Nobody is the owner of anything. Except for the corporations, as they are the only ones with "legal protection". The state's protection is not destined for citizens, but rather for large scale production enterprises.

2. Would you say that the Washington Consensus with its structural adjustment programs is the more important impetus for the modern push of extractivism? In a footnote to the essay by Mirta Antonelli we surprised to read that between 1990 and 1997, mineral exploration investments increased by 400%, in Peru by as much as 2000%.³

Maristella Svampa: When we refer to the situation of Latin America today, we prefer to use the term "Commodities Consensus." The Washington Consensus was based on a financial evaluation and on a politics of austerity and privatization, which led to a redefinition of the state as a meta-regulator. The Commodities Consensus is rooted in the same situation, but its fundamental concern is the re-primarization of the economy: large-scale export of raw materials, among them hydrocarbons (gas and oil), metals and minerals (copper, gold, silver, tin, bauxite, zinc and others), foodstuff (corn, soy and wheat) and biofuels.

In terms of the social context, the Commodities Consensus implies the reinforcement of the "accumulation by dispossession" dynamic, a term coined by the geographer David Harvey. This dynamic entails the dispossession of land from small farmers and indigenous communities, and the concentration of land, resources and soil in the hands of big corporations, with the help and approval of the various governments. It is hardly a coincidence that Latin American critical literature interprets these processes as the consolidation of a neo-extractivist development model, usually defined in terms of a pattern of accumulation based on the overexploitation of (mostly non-renewable) natural resources, as well as on the expansion of capital into territories previously considered unproductive.

The normative grounds of the Commodities Consensus were established at the time of the Washington Consensus, but the period of economic expansion came after, and is linked to the global boom in commodity prices which began in 2003. It is from this point onwards that the extractive frontier in peripheral countries starts to expand very rapidly.

3. Can you explain the relation between these structural adjustment programs and the direct investments into /acquisitions of land?

Maristella Svampa: The expansion of the soybean production frontier entailed a reconfiguration of the rural context in various South American countries. According to Oxfam figures (2016), between 2000 and 2014 soy plantations in South America grew in 29 million hectares, a surface equivalent to the territory of Ecuador. Ninety percent of the region's soy production is concentrated in Brazil and Argentina, even though the most rapid expansion has taken place in Uruguay. In Paraguay, the crop that covers most land is soybean: 67% of the country's total farmland.

Neo-extractivism presents a specific territorial dynamic, centred on land hoarding and an intensive use of the soil, via monocultures and single crop farming. One of the consequences of this is the displacement of other forms of production (local/regional economies) as well as populations. Within this context, at the start of the 21st century, neo-extractivism redefined the nature of land disputes, creating an asymmetrical confrontation between poor and vulnerable populations and large economic corporations, whose interests lay in imposing genetically modified crops of soy, palm oil, and sugar cane, among others. According to a report by Oxfam (collating the agriculture and livestock farming census of 15 countries), 1% of the largest farms in the region comprise more than half of the total farmland. In other words, 1% of the plantations control more land than the remaining 99%. Colombia is the most unequal in relation to land distribution. There, 0.4% of the farms comprise 68% of the country's land. Peru follows closely, where 77% of the farmland is in the hands of 1% of the farms. Then we find Chile (74%), Paraguay (71%), Bolivia, where 1% of the farms control 66% of the farmland, Mexico (56%), and Brazil, where 44% of the farmland is in the hands of 1% of the farms. In Argentina, 36% of the land is controlled by large landowners and farming pools.

4. You both describe the extractivism policy of leftist governments whose self-conception knows no alternatives and who accept the sell-out of resources as "economic destiny". How can you explain this lack of alternatives?

Maristella Svampa: Indeed, in contrast to the 1990s, starting in 2000-2003, Latin American economies benefitted from high prices of commodities in international markets. This had a clear effect on the trade balance and led to fiscal surplus. This fact cannot be dismissed, because during the previous decades – more specifically during an openly neoliberal phase in the 1990s – they had gone through a long period of economic stagnation and regression. Within this favorable economic context – at least up until 2013 – the tendency within Latin American countries was to highlight the comparative advantages of the commodities boom, while at the same time denying or minimizing the new socio-environmental inequalities and asymmetries which accompanied the consolidation of a development model based on large scale export of raw materials. All Latin American governments, independent of their ideological affiliation, supported the return of a productivist vision of development, which, together with the developmentalist illusion entailed denying and avoiding an in-depth discussion about its social, environmental and territorial impact, as well as the dismissal of the emerging socio-environmental movements and protests.

The Commodities Consensus focused on the large-scale implementation of export-based extractive projects, creating a more flexible space in terms of the state's function. This allowed for the peaceful coexistence of progressive governments – which have questioned the orthodox version of the neoliberal consensus – with those other governments who continue to reinforce a neoliberal-conservative political framework.

From a progressive (or "populist" as it is interpreted in Europe) perspective, the Commodities Consensus is linked to the action of the state and to a whole range of economic and social policies aimed at the most vulnerable sectors of society. At the basis of it was the extraordinary profits associated with the extractive export model. Within the new context, the state recovered certain institutional tools and functions. It again became a regulating body, and in certain cases, an agent of redistribution. However, within the theoretical framework of world government practices, centred on a notion of institutionality based on supranational contexts, the general tendency is precisely the opposite, for the national state not to become a "mega-agent", nor for its interventions to support structural changes. Rather, the most important hypothesis envisions the return to an understanding of the state as a moderate regulator, capable of negotiating a space of variable geometry, that is, part of a multi-agent configuration, within the context of

an increasingly complex civil society – with the emergence of social movements, NGOs and other agents –, but with close links to multinational capital, whose impact on the Latin American economies has not exactly diminished, but rather has increased significantly. As such, despite the fact that the progressive approach has been heterodox and has distanced itself from neoliberalism, in terms of the orientating role of the state, as the Argentinian economist Mariano Feliz rightfully points out, the progressive position did not even begin to question the hegemony of transnational capital within peripheral economies. This fact set clear limits to the actions of the national government, as well as tracing an inevitable threshold to the demands for the democratization of collective decision-making, which originated in the communities and populations affected by the extractive mega-projects.

On the other hand, we have to point out that in Latin America, a large part of the left and of progressive populism continues to support a productivist understanding of development, which tends to privilege a specific reading of social conflict in terms of the opposition between capital and labour, minimizing and paying little attention to the relationship between capital and nature, as well as to the new forms of social struggle based on the defense of the land and the commons. Within this context, and especially at the beginning of the progressive political cycle, the dynamic of dispossession could not be conceptualized and thus became a blind spot. As a consequence, socio-environmental issues were considered a secondary problem, or simply, an issue likely to be sacrificed, in relation to the structural problems of poverty and exclusion in Latin American societies. And thus, despite the fact that in the last few decades leftist and populist Latin American governments implemented a process of revaluation of the community-indigenous matrix, a large part of these governments continued to adhere to a production and efficiency-based understanding of development, very much linked to the hegemonic ideology of progress, and based on the support of the expansion of productive forces.

5. How does this rhetoric of a lack of alternatives differ from the new right-wing politics? Is there an even more extreme exploitation of the country? Or is the exploitation continuous, but now, as it were, propagandistic, like Bolsonaro's announcement to open the Amazon rainforest to the economy?

Maristella Svampa: Progressive governments tried to justify neo-extractivism by claiming that this was the only option of generating currency for the state, in order to then either redistribute this income and stimulate domestic consumption, or finance practices with a greater added value. The aim of this discourse, whose actual reach should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, and in terms of the different phases and specific historico-political moments, was to set a simplistic opposition between the social question (redistribution, social policies) and the environmental issue (the conservation of the commons, the protection of the land). At the same time, it sidelined complex and fundamental discussions about Development, environmental sustainability and Democracy. In fact, Latin American governments promoted in the name of "comparative advantages" a model of social inclusion based on consumerism in plebeian-progressive terms, going as far as to deny its short-term nature. Such a temporary adjustment between the state's progress, economic growth and the citizen-consumer model was the condition of possibility of an election victory and the ability to remain in power of the various governments (via re-elections).

Let me address your question in more specific terms: pillage does not only figure in terms of propaganda; it is real, although it has to be understood in terms of recursive practices, of processes. With the passing of time, and given the new modalities of expansion of the capital frontier, social conflicts multiplied as well. At the same time new forms of social resistance became more active and organized. In relation to this, I identify three different phases of neo-extractivism:

The first phase is marked by positivity; it took place between 2003 and 2008/10. Within the context of the commodities price boom, the extractivist turn was read in relation to its comparative advantages, as a "new developmentalism" independent of the differences between progressive and conservative governments. I would like to highlight the fact that it was indeed a phase of positivity, given the increase in social spending and its impact in the reduction of poverty, the growing role of the state and the expansion of popular participation. All of these produced great expectations in society, especially after having experienced consecutive economic crises and suffered decades of economic stagnation and neoliberal austerity. Let us not forget that between 2002 and 2011 poverty figures in the region dropped from 44% to 31.4%, whilst extreme poverty fell from 19.4% to 12.3% (Cepal, 2012). Most of the countries in the

region implemented a series of social policies, which would reach 19% of the population (Cepal, 2013), that is, about 120 million people benefitted from different social policies.

This period of economic growth and of the redefinition of the role of the state was also a period with little visibility, almost no acknowledgement of the forms of conflict derived from the extractive dynamic; it ran until 2008-10 approximately. From this point onwards, progressive governments, each strong in their own governing term (many of them, having achieved re-election and renewed their presidential term), gradually consolidated and defended an explicitly extractivist economic framework, in response to the increasingly hostile nature of a number of territorial and socio-environmental conflicts. Moreover, the expansion of the conflict linked to extractive activities (mega-mining, mega-dams, oil, expansion of the farming frontier) would demonstrate not only the real dimension and alliances constitutive of hegemonic developmentalism, but also the limits imposed on citizen participation processes, and the emergence of sites of criminalization of the conflict.

The second phase is linked to the multiplication of mega-projects, and the ensuing intensification of social resistance. In relationship to the former, this fact is clearly reflected in the National Development Plans introduced by the various governments. In all cases, the emphasis lay clearly in increasing the number of extractive projects, according to the specifics of each country: mineral extraction, oil, hydroelectric power plants, and the expansion of genetically modified crops. In Brazil, this took the form of the Growth Acceleration Plan (PAC in Portuguese), launched in 2007. It included the construction of a high number of dams in the Amazon, as well as the implementation of energy mega-projects linked to the exploitation of oil and gas reserves. In Bolivia, the promise was that of a great Industrial leap, and it centered around the incrementation of extraction projects – gas, lithium and iron – as well as the expansion of agrobusiness, among others. In Ecuador we saw the emergence of open pit mega-mining, as well as the expansion of the oil frontier, and in Venezuela the Strategic Plan for Oil Production entailed shifting the frontier of exploitation into the Orinoco belt. In Argentina, the Strategic Plan for Farming 2010-2020, projected a 60% increase in grain production, and later also supported fracking (2012). And so, even from within the context of a supposedly industrialist rhetoric, the aim of the different governments' public policies was clearly to reinforce the neo-extractivist model, which at that time was still linked to extraordinary profits.

This second phase is located within a period of Commodities Consensus "laundering," that is to say, a period of great and open conflict in the territories marked for extractive activities. Indeed, the number of socio-environmental and territorial conflicts that managed to transcend their local context and acquired national media attention was high: from a dispute around a road-building project that was going to cut through the Tipnis (Bolivia); the mega-dam construction project in Belo Monte (Brasil); the popular protests in Fatamina in opposition to mega-mining (Argentina, 2012); up to the cancelation of the Yasuni Plan (Ecuador, 2013). What remains clear is that the expansion of the (collective, territorial, environmental) rights frontier has found its boundary in the growing expansion of capital's exploitation frontier – in search of goods, land and soil – and this put an end to the narratives of emancipation which by then had gathered high expectations, especially in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador.

We have to add to these emblematic conflicts in countries with progressive governments, those that took place in the same vein in countries with neoliberal and conservative governments. Such was the case with the mining project in Peru called Conga, which is today suspended; or the opposition to the mining mega-project La Colosa in the area of Tolima, Colombia, which was finally dropped in 2017; the dam Agua Zarca in the Gualcarque river in Honduras, which was cancelled after the actions of the Honduran Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organisations (COPINH in Spanish), founded by Berta Cáceres, who would later be murdered in 2016.

In summary, in light of the various territorial and environmental conflicts and of their recursive nature, Latin American governments ended up by adopting a clearly belligerent developmentalist discourse in defence of neo-extractivism. In addition, the productivist narrative, linked to the myth of El Dorado, was openly supported and enforced via the criminalization of forms of resistance. This affinity between discourse and practice was evident even in those countries that had raised the highest political expectations in relation to the possibility of change, especially in terms of the promise of Good Living linked to the care of nature –

as in Ecuador and Bolivia. It clearly illustrated the evolution of progressive governments towards more traditional models of domination (mostly linked to the classic populist and nation-state model). At the same time it compelled the recognition that we had entered a new phase marked by the retraction of the boundaries of democracy, evident in the lack of tolerance towards dissidence.

Today we find ourselves within the third phase. From 2013/15 up to today, we are witnessing an intensification of neo-extractivism. One of the most significant factors that help explain this phenomenon, in terms of an aggravated continuity, is the drop in the prices of raw materials, which propelled Latin American governments to further increase the number of extractive projects, via the expansion of the commodity frontiers. Although they were prepared for a fall in the prices of basic goods (as can be clearly seen in the case of Venezuela), consequences in the form of a decline in commercial deficit and a recession were quick to follow.

We must add to this the downturn of the progressive/populist hegemony and the end of the progressive political cycle, which will have a great impact on the reconfiguration of the regional political map, with the right in Argentina and the far right in Brazil clearly on the rise.

6. The program of economic autonomy through an independent industry was a global narrative in the decolonization movements before and after the Second World War. Maristella, you write about a disappearance of the narrative of "development" as a future that was blocked by the debt crisis in the 1980s. Is it now more or less projected onto space, the "infinite" resources of land?

Maristella Svampa: My point is that the notion of Development, inasmuch as it is the great Western narrative which has permeated the Latin American social imaginary, has undergone a critical questioning from within various perspectives: environmental, feminist, indigenist, and social. The term Development, with a capital D, was not mentioned in the 1990s. But an imaginary centered on Development made a strong comeback with the commodities boom, and in relation to the large scale export of raw materials, when it was introduced into the political discourse of peripheral countries. Not only was the development model based on an instrumental and productivist perspective, it also entailed the actualization of various social imaginaries linked to the (historic) abundance of natural resources (the land of plenty, an el-dorado-based vision of the continent).

A no less important issue is the fact that neo-extractivism and the discourse of Development are producing more and more casualties in the globalized periphery, with Latin America holding the world record. Just like in the past, the El-Dorado-based illusion gradually turns into a renewed dialectic of dispossession and dependence, which comes hand-in-hand with more extractivism, more violence, and consequently less democracy. This process is on the rise. Only in 2016, from a total of 200 murdered environmental activists worldwide, 60% of those murders took place in Latin America, and these figures recurred in 2017. There is no reason to believe that these numbers will drop, quite the contrary, when we consider the most recent conservative turn. This is exemplified in countries such as Argentina and Brazil, whose current governments have not only intensified the extractivist model in all of its versions, increasing state violence against the most vulnerable populations, but they have also implemented a series of public policies that effectively result in an important regression of social rights.

7. There is an imaginary of the resource state – as the El Dorado, which corresponds to the myth of the land of plenty and the terra nullius, where the concepts of settlement and conquer are coming together. Is that one of the reasons why this myth is again up to date with the new right-wing ideologies?

Gabriela Massuh: In Argentina the polarization between "civilization" or "barbarism" has led to the "Conquest of the Desert". This dialectical relationship between productive civilization and barbarism runs through the whole of Argentinian history. The understanding of this disjunctive as the engine behind the creation of the national state was first coined by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in his famous book "Facundo or Civilisation and Barbarism in the Argentinian Pampas" (1845). Today this continues to function as the originary myth of the Argentinian nation.

Sarmiento's "Facundo" sets the grounds for Argentinian capitalism in its phase of primitive accumulation. This takes place via the forging of a heroic deed which must triumph over the desert. It is about legitimizing a war waged in order to wipe off indigenous barbarism from the land, triumph over a hostile nature, build bridges, win battles against the rivers in order to make them navigable, tread down poverty, dispossess, clean, penetrate, impose. This is the narrative of the foundation of Argentina, which up to the present is rooted in the idea that any political action must be bound to an idea of progress – itself necessarily, a struggle against the void.

The concept of the desert in Argentina is, when we look at it from this perspective, always a symbol of starting anew. It requires a demiurgic, ex nihilo construction, major surgery operations that remove previous illnesses in order to always found a new era. All forms of progress in the desert are part of a military campaign where the enemy must be annihilated: indios, a torrid nature, illiterate gauchos, lack of culture, barbarism, wild forms of living, towns filled with misery, abandoned train stations, traces of the past, collective memories, common knowledges, belongings. This is a battle that must be won, just like today in the city of Buenos Aires where we continue to insist on reclaiming land from the river, that is, on distancing ourselves from it, on extending the city airport, building motorways, destroying the riverside, and building taller and taller buildings along its shore without taking into account the rising water levels or the visual and environmental pollution.

The concept of terra nullius was used in colonial times in order to declare the land in the colonies unoccupied land, which consequently, the "discovering" or conquering state could legally occupy. The English translation of the latin concept makes no reference to its legal dimension, and terra nullius is defined as "empty land; land legally belonging to anyone." And so, the idea that any land external to the state is susceptible, first of all, of being conquered; secondly, of being civilized and catechized; and thirdly, of being submitted to rational (capitalist) exploitation. In the Spanish colonies of South America, the concept was also applied in private jurisprudence, in order to strip indigenous peoples of their property rights over the land as former occupiers. This colonial "justice" legalized the distribution of land among the colonial settlers.

Within this context, in Argentina the landscape of the barbarian pampa is thus built against a memory that returns to these sites in order to fill them with meaning and intensity. The eagerness to civilize (capitalize, ascribe value to) the desert turns any consideration of the landscape into a tabula rasa, transforming it into the artificial ponds of the gated communities, introducing exotic nature into it, drying up its marshes, and killing the original fauna, in order to fill it with a progress made to the measure of Disneyworld. We thus come back to the notion of terra nullius, a land that is empty for the usufruct of capital.

The concept of res nullius was at the basis of the forging of the new right to conquest in order to legitimize the right to war. When the fact that the new territories were not uninhabited became indisputable, that they were not just a desert to occupy, that its inhabitants – even though they lacked a soul according the theological episteme – at least had a "right to possession", it was necessary to produce a narrative that would justify the appropriation of vast territories whose inhabitants were... human. Colonial jurisprudence was based on the theories of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch jurist, who for many is the founder of modern International law. His most important work on the matter, *De jure belli ac pacis*, can be summarized as the attempt to adjust war to law and, if you will, to turn war into an instrument of the law.

Grotius introduced to that effect a number of key specifications into the Roman notion of res nullius. He proposed that the mere occupation of land by indigenous populations was not equivalent to property and, therefore, it did not provide the grounds for rights. For Grotius, that which provides rights over an inhabited land is productive work from it. His conceptual expansion was new: on the one hand, the division between the mere occupation of land, and the productive use of it. On the other hand, he highlighted that the right to the land of subjects with *animus usufructuandi* is superior to that of the mere inhabitants that occupy it. He thus provided the former with the right to resort to what would be understood as a legitimate war for the sake of production. Grotius is an emblematic case of colonial investment. Identified as the father of Public International Law, and considered one of the most important contributors

to the establishment of a peaceful International order, his ideas in fact accord the state the right to wage war.

Today the extractive state pushes forward in a manner similar to that of the Spanish conquistador. Any land or space that must be acquired for the extractive fury is considered, just as in the past, an empty space to be used for the usufruct of capital. In this sense land becomes again a space to be conquered, to reap a hefty usufruct from, to catechize with one particular faith – that of progress and productivity. And so the land and the space is again and again victimized and emptied of meaning, content and signifiers, and extractivism repeatedly turns new territories into nobody's land, *terrae nullius*. These are the lands devastated by extractivism: a clean slate, starting again, over and over, with a clean white page, in a never-ending present, unencumbered by the passing time – in praise of amnesia, in praise of a productive civilisation over the barbarism of merely being in time.

8. We don't quite remember where we read it, but there was also the concept of land as a "quarry", which sounds much inferior to the Land of Plenty, much more after the plunder and devastation. We think of your investigation, Gabriela, on the real estate economy in Buenos Aires, but we also think about how lifetime and subjectivity is such a quarry that is extracted and used as a resource. Would you consider extractivism a general social phenomenon of the present?

Gabriela Massuh: "Living on the crust" or "feeling as if one is standing on the crust" is a metaphor coined by Mirta Antonelli⁵ in one of her studies on mega-mining, where she engages with the idea of the production of subjectivities as a consequence of extractivist mining. This is a topic that she comes back to in various articles on the subject. She refers specifically to the expulsion of populations – generally indigenous – as an effect of the environmental pressure exerted by the mining industry on their land (water poisoning, soil infertility, and the impossibility of maintaining a family-sized farm, just to cite a few examples). The main idea here is that what is taking place is the experience of expulsion being felt by bodies and subjectivities, the feeling of "losing the ground under one's feet," of having all the common goods that make life possible in a familiar space ripped away from you. It is for this reason that Antonella also discusses the idea of a diffuse death: to stay is to perish, but to leave also is to die. This is the condition of the migrant today. It is the same that those who were and have been expelled from their land felt and suffered.

In relation to this metaphor of an extractive subjectivity, that of living on the crust, of "losing the ground under one's feet," the analysis of the legal figure of the superficiary, the surface rights holder, which Maristella Svampa develops in her autobiographical book, is interesting.⁶ Maristella grew up in Allen, a town in a region of Patagonia marked by intensive fruit production called Alto Valle del Rio Negro. Her family was part of the *chacareros*, owners of small farms where apple-, pear-, and other fruit trees were grown for domestic consumption, as well as for export. It was a small-sized middle class, which could live off what they produced and could send their children to study in capitals of province with good universities. Maristella's book chronicles the ineffable sadness that creeps up when something is gradually, albeit inexorably, lost. It is not necessarily the loss of a social class, but the loss of the landscape of one's childhood. The book delves into that hole created by extractivism: the disavowal of affective memory.

And what happened with the *chacareros* of the Alto Valle del Rio Negro? In the early 1990s, under the ultra-neoliberal government of Carlos Menem, it was discovered that that fertile valley sat on top of generous oil reserves. Oil derricks began to sprout up among the fruit tree orchards, a process that was prompted by the Hydrocarbon Law of 1992 which transferred control of the oil fields from the public domain to the provincial governments, and privatized part of the social capital of YPF (*Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales*, "Fiscal Oilfields" in English), which until then was the hydrocarbon state-owned company. The highly polluting derricks lived side by side with the fruit orchards for almost two decades. But with the passing of time, the Alto Valle became part of one of the largest shale gas reserve extraction sites in the world: *Vaca Muerta* (dead cow), a project still advertised today as "the salvation of Argentina". And so, fracking made its appearance, the universal panacea for attracting foreign investment. The thing is that it also attracts high levels of pollution, the disappearance of species, and

especially, briberies, which corporations pay the chacareros. These rent out their land to the fracking industry, and don't live from the fruit of their orchards anymore, but rather, from rentals.

Many chacareros in the Alto Valle were tempted by the easy money and stopped farming. The political pressure which was added to the corporate pressure was unbeatable. After years of protests and processes of community consciousness-raising implemented by those who were defending their labor, the brilliance of the green of that once fruitful valley began to fade. Today, the fruit that was once produced there, is imported, which translates into rising fruit prices, no longer under the state's control. In each of her trips to the village of her birth, Maristella observed an increase in oil derrick numbers, and the pollution of water for those who chose to continue growing fruit trees. She also witnessed how the field with the old poplar trees was broken up and flattened, how the risk of explosion due to a gas leak increased in family homes. New illnesses emerged, farms suffered plagues and water began to be scarce. The landscape, once a blossoming and fertile field, turned into a wasteland.

Footnotes

1 Maristella Svampa, except for the answer to question 8, which is part of a new project, the following answers have been taken from my book *Las fronteras del neoextractivismo en América Latina* (The frontiers of neo-extractivism in Latin America), Mexico, Calas, 2018, available online..

<https://www.transcript-verlag.de/978-3-8376-4526-2/las-fronteras-del-neoextractivismo-en-america-latina/>

2 "The 'superficiary', surface rights holder, can build, farm or forest on the surface of the land, the subsoil and the air space of the land plot which he rents from the owner. He then becomes the rightful owner of the product of his farming, foresting and building. The right over farms, forests and buildings can also be constituted by officially making them the property of the superficiary. In both cases, the rights of the superficiary exist side by side with the property rights of the landowner." Article 2115 of the Argentina Civil Code, <http://bibliotecadigital.com.ar/ccyc/index.htm?context=290>

3 Mirta Antonelli, (Geo)Graphien transnationaler mega-mineria: Alte Strategien der Herrschaft (The Geography of transnational mega-mining: Old Strategies of Power), p. 190, in: *Lateinamerikas koloniales Gedächtnis, Vom Ende der Ressourcen, so wie wir sie kennen* (The Colonial Memory of Latin America: On the End of Resources as We Know Them) ed. Julia Roth, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2015, Reader for the conference at Hebbel am Ufer Theatre, Berlin, 13-15 October 2010.

4 Maristella Svampa: *New Development Extractivism: Governments and Social Movements in Latin America*, p. 153.

5 Mirta Antonelli: *Megaminiria, Desterritorializacion del Estado y Biopolitica megamineria, desterritorializacion del estado y biopolitica* revistas.unc.edu.ar

6 Maristella Svampa: *Chacra 51, Return to Patagonia in the time of Fracking*, 2018 – Horacio Machado Aráoz, Potosí. The Origin. Genealogy of Contemporary Mining. Buenos Aires, 2013 (Mardulce Publishing).

Translation with deep!

Proofreading by Clemens Krümmel



La Flagelación de Jesús, Anonymous, 18th century, San Pedro, Potosí



Christus auf der Rast, ca. 1500, Peter Breuer for the Sankt Nikolai Church in Freiberg, Stadt- und Bergbaumuseum Freiberg



Can you compare a back with a mountain?

During our first stay in Potosí, 2006, we immediately compared the Cerro Rico, the Silver Mountain, its many holes and waste dumps, with a motif that we found in the paintings in churches all over town. It was the back of the flagellated Christ – a canonized motif of the Passion. Even if we denied to compare the mountain and the tortured back, we had to do so – as if responding a stimulus. Wasn't this equation – the back and the wounds / mountain and holes / your own fate and the mercy of God – exactly the kind of Christian comfort that was exercised to "subject" people since centuries?

The chronicler of Potosí, Arzáns de Orsúa y Vela, described "the miracle worked in the parish of San Pedro of this City by the Mother of God of Candelaria on behalf of some Indians imprisoned in a mine in the Mountain,"¹ where the figure of the painting – the Mother of God - appeared in the tunnel to save the miners, who were buried there. We saw the painting "Christo flagelado" in the same parish in 2009.

"The curators of the 'Potosí Principle' project selected the painting 'Cristo Flagelado' ('Christ Flagellated') by an anonymous artist. However, the parish community of San Pedro decided that it would not lend the painting under any circumstances. We investigated why this decision was taken. (...) The guarantees that the Museo Reina Sofia could make to return the original painting to our country are somewhat unreliable. Nobody (...) in the district of San Pedro knows the chairman of this museum, or how reliable he may be. Furthermore, neither the deputy minister for culture nor the government would be valid partners in such a deal, since the administrators in charge of our heritage are the main suspects in the illegal exporting of our heritage to the international black market," the sociologists Luis Aleman Vargas wrote as a response to our request. He concluded: *"In short, the application to borrow the painting 'Cristo Flagelado' made by the Museo Reina Sofia, via the Bolivian Government, to the San Pedro parish community, reflects the colonial relationship that we Bolivians have with foreign institutions, be it museums, companies, international aid agencies, etc., who decide which paintings they would like to borrow/take from the country as if shopping in a supermarket. They are abetted in this by certain upper-middle-class bureaucrats intent on lining their pockets by loaning/selling resources that belong to the country as a whole, but that are kept in specific communities, such as the district of San Pedro. Luckily, the parish community of San Pedro is not so trusting and remains circumspect in its dealings with these institutions, like the ayllus (extended family networks) in the north of Potosí in their dealings with neighboring mines (...), holding their resources independently and resisting the ongoing embezzlement in Potosí".²*

How convincing it is to compare the lending of pictures with the extractivism of resources! For the catalogue we received permission to do a better photo of the painting than the snapshot we did on our visit in 2009. When it was sent to us, we saw that the photographed painting was a copy of the original one. There were some rumors that the painting was stolen or saved after our visit, and that the parish did this copy to substitute it / to cover the theft or the thieves from persecution, and we were again confronted with the wealth of our gaze as foreigners of a mighty country, commissioned by a mighty institution in Spain. We have been strictly excluded from the negotiations of lending, not to disturb diplomatic processes of cultural administrations. We remember our only visit to the parish, sitting in a garden and talking with the priest. But this was far from the needed dedication of time to trust each other – to convince someone far away about a project whose meanings and purpose must have stayed unclear. In both cases – the paintings and the resources – this expectation of "coming to be a wealth" initiates a machinery which cuts any other possibilities of understanding.

We saw a similar back last year in Freiberg in Saxony. It was the back of Christ resting on his way to Golgotha. It was part of a wooden figure, which was created around 1500,³ at the peak of silver mining in the region, before silver imports from America and the 30-year war financed by this silver with its large mercenary armies ended this first phase of silver mining in Saxony.

Are these wounds ciphers, similar to the lists that the chroniclers wrote, could they not represent the abundance of the treasures in any other way than through lists that did not come to an end – the records of Arzans, Acosta, Oviedo, Pinelo?⁴ Do the lists on the back supplement these lists of profits from the mountain by listing the amount of life's use that were necessary and were just as unpredictable to recover the treasures? Curved on one back during the rest before it goes to the gallows, this execution, which – we know from the Christian economy – the great distribution of this battered body to everyone promises as a shared fate, a fate that turns into a promise of justice, that is rescheduled to the end of the world and accumulates in the crooked, creaking, carved-wood splendour of the gold-plated altars, the pictures of which are there to work miracles. when the tunnel breaks in and you are trapped in the dark.

As in Potosí, investments into technology and infrastructure were made in Saxony after the first slump in profits, too. In Potosí, it was the amalgamation process, the large reservoirs in the mountains for driving hydropower and the introduction of forced labor. In Saxony it was an increasingly detailed division of labor in the pits, in the administration and further development of machines and pump technology. In 1557, Gregorius Agricola's treatise "Vom Berghwerck" was published. In another issue we already wrote that this treatise was also known in Potosí.⁵ The same issue shows excerpts from a miner's march, a long picture sheet that gives an impression of the division of labor and camera technology that controls the extraction of silver and the use of labor. This issue was about whether machines can create value, whether the exploitation of labour through automation becomes unnecessary.⁶ What the machines promise is to completely remove people from production in order to make them reappear among consumers who have to consume what the machines spit out all the time.

Why can't the machines stop?

Because you have to compare a back to a mountain.

In mid-19th century, silver production flourished again in Freiberg. After this increase, the decline began due to cheaper overseas imports from Mexico, Chile and Peru, and the abolition of the silver currency in the German Reich in 1871. This is followed by the mining of cobalt and most recently uranium in the GDR, which was shut down during the transformation period in the 1990s. In the regions of Saxony and Thuringia, a handicraft developed in the 19th century that now floods the German souvenir shops as Erzgebirge figures. The figures were originally incorporated into mechanical theatres in which the mining machinery was transferred to show the story of the birth and passion of Christ to be presented by individual figures. These Theatra Mundi have been presented at public fairs. There were also smaller mechanical theatres. "Hump mines were reserved for miners who no longer work underground due to injuries and who could make a little money by demonstrating ... at fairs."⁷ They were mines that the showmen carried on their backs.

"And in a miniature mine, jerky little figures chopped against the tunnel walls, and carts pulled by stiff-legged horses came up on rails, and shovels rose over the carts, and the carts moved further, and baskets descended through mine shafts, and carts inclined and waving over advancing trains, and everything shook and jerked until the work suddenly stopped, and everything stopped in the middle of a movement, arms paused in the air with a hoe hoisted, horses froze, baskets got stuck in the shaft until everything jerked went on again, pushed on, everything hopped on, everything shagged on, everything chopped on, everything cracked on again. And on a field chair next to it sat an old man with a white beard and a broad-brimmed floppy hat, rigid and lost, leaning against his mechanical box, deaf to all questions that were addressed to him."⁸

Let us now come to another way of thinking about labor in the tunnel, thinking about backs which carry sacks, baskets and bundles. It is a possible way that extracts nothing but earth from the tunnels, because the tunnels are supposed to lead to what can be called the promise of the extinction of this

power, which commands the extraction of resources. The extinction frees resources from being valuable and those figures from the creation of value. This work in this gallery is driven by a promise that no longer sits in creaking altars in its pictures that descend from there to slave labourers buried in the gallery. It is suspended from the hump and from the mountain, it is always present - no matter how much effort in vain are involved.

"Above all, it was necessary to determine the road that would be most suitable for the Tsar's journey from the station to the port. A grocery shop should be opened on this street. ... I gradually gave the Perovskaya 900 rubles, which were used to rent the shop, to buy colonial goods, for drilling tools, to support those involved and their work. – Work was immediately started; time was short, the Tsar was expected in May. It was already April. We were only able to work at night because the mine did not come from the back rooms, but from the store, where customers came and went during the day. The work turned out to be very tedious. It was clay soil in which the drill penetrated heavily. We were finally under the pavement. The drill pushed through to the surface. Then it happened that Gregori Isajew's three fingers were torn away by carelessly handling the detonator with explosive mercury. He endured it stoically. But we were beside ourselves. He had to go to the hospital. Since we feared that the explosion might have caught the attention of the other house residents, we call all dynamite, mercury, wire and so on (...) into my apartment. (..) We had been able to pile up the earth in the room. After the work was finished, we wanted to take it away in case the houses were inspected before the Tsar passed through. I found a place in my apartment where we could store the earth. We brought it to me in baskets, packages, and bundles, which I emptied when the house residents were absent and our servant was sent away with an order. Meanwhile the rumors of a trip of the Tsar to Livadia had stopped. Soon afterwards we received instructions from the committee to stop the work. (...) The shop was closed, the earth had been returned to the underground passage in the same way as we had brought it out. I helped by bringing the sacks into the basement at night, where the men pounded them".⁹

A.C., June 2020

Footnotes

1 Bartolomé Arzáns de Orsúa y Vela, *Historia de la Villa Imperial de Potosí*, 1615, Book VI, Chapter 19, in: Luis Hanke, *An English Translation of the Chapter Headings of the Historia de la Villa Imperial de Potosí*, Brown University, Providence, 1965.

2 Victor Alemán Vargas, *The Looting of Potosí*, in: *How Can We Sing the Song of the Lord in an Alien Land? The Potosí Principle*, ed. by Alice Creischer, Max Jorge Hinderer, Andreas Siekmann, Walther König, Cologne 2010, p. 68.

3 „Christus auf der Rast“, ca. 1500, Peter Breuer for the Sankt Nikolai Church in Freiberg, Stadt- und Bergbaumuseum Freiberg.

4 Bartolomé Arzáns de Orsúa y Vela, *Historia de la Villa Imperial de Potosí*, Potosí, beginning of 17th century. – José de Acosta, *Historia natural y moral de las Indias*, Seville, 1591 – Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, *Historia general de las Indias*, Seville, 1566 – Antonio de León Pinelo, *El Paraíso en el nuevo Mundo*, 17th century, ed. by Raul Porras Barrenechea, Lima 1943.

5 Gregorius Agricola: *Vom Bergwerck*, 1557, ed. by Hans Prescher, Leipzig 1965, in : Letter to Georges, in Brochure 1b. The book was soon becoming basic knowledge on mining worldwide. One Chinese translation from 1640 could be found in the library of Nanjing. In 1569, the compendium was translated into Spanish. In the Casa Moneda Museum in Potosí you can find the book "De Arte de los Metales" by Alonzo Barba from 1640 which refers to Agricola many times. An evident link might be the machines you can still see there.

6 Cf. Letter to Georges, in Brochure 1b. – Die historische Bergparade anlässlich des Saturnfestes im Jahre 1719, Eberhard Wächter, Eberhard Neubert, VEB Verlag für Grundstoffindustrie, Leipzig, 1982. – A 38m long leporello, made by an anonymous artist and without an exact data, archived at the library of the Bergakademie Freiberg. There are two reproductions of it published. One by a Miner Union in West Germany (Eisenhütte Westfalia), 1957, and another in the GDR, 1982.

7 *Theatrum Mundi, Mechanische Szenen in Volkskunst und Puppenspiel*, Puppentheatersammlung, Museum für Volkskunst, Dresden 1984.

You can see these mechanical theatres in the whole region in Saxonia and Thuringia, among them: Puppenmuseum, Dresden, Ströhersche Sammlung, Museum Manufaktur der Träume, Annaberg Buchholz, Museum für bergmännische Volkskunst, Schneeberg, Stadt- und Bergbaumuseum Freiberg.

8 „Und in einem Miniaturbergwerk hackten ruckhaft kleine Gestalten gegen Stollenwände, und Karren, von steifbeinigen Pferden gezogen, rückten auf Schienen heran, und Schaufeln hoben sich über die Karren, und weiter rückten die Karren, und Körbe senkten sich durch Schächte hinab, und Karren neigten und schwenkten sich über vorrückenden Züge, und alles rüttelte und ruckte, bis das Werk plötzlich verstummte, und alles hielt inne mitten in einer Bewegung, Arme verharrten in der Luft mit hochgehobener Hacke, Pferde erstarrten, Körbe blieben hängen im Schacht, bis mit einem Ruck alles wieder weitging, weiterruckte, weiterzuckte, alles weiterhoppelte, alles weiterzottelte, alles weiterhackte, alles weiterknackte. Und auf einem Feldstuhl daneben saß ein Alter mit einem weißen Bart und breitrandigem Schlapphut, starr und versunken lehnte er an seinem mechanischen Kasten, taub für alle Fragen, die man an ihn richtete.“

Peter Weiss, *Abschied von den Eltern, Suhrkamp*, Frankfurt, 2007, p. 22.

9 „Vor allen Dingen galt es, die Straße festzulegen, die für die Fahrt des Zaren vom Bahnhof zum Hafen am meisten in Betracht käme. In dieser Strasse sollten ein Laden aufgemacht werden. Von diesem Laden aus sollte die Mine bis unter den Fahrdamm betrieben werden. (...) Ich übergab der Perowskaja nach und nach 900 Rubel, die zur Miete des Ladens verwandt wurden, zur Anschaffung von Kolonialwaren, für Bohrwerkzeuge, zum Unterhalt der Beteiligten und ihrer Arbeit. – Sofort wurde zur Arbeit geschritten; die Zeit drängte, man erwartete den Zaren im Mai. Es war schon April. Dabei konnten wir nur nachts arbeiten, da die Mine nicht von den Hinterräumen ausging, sondern vom Laden, wo tags Kunden aus und eingingen. Die Arbeit erwies sich als sehr mühselig. Es war Lehmboden, in dem der Bohrer schwer eindrang. Endlich waren wir unterm Pflaster angelangt. Der Bohrer stieß zur Oberfläche durch. Da geschah es, dass unserem Gregori Isajew durch unvorsichtige Handhabung der Sprengkapsel mit Explosivquecksilber drei Finger weggerissen wurden. Er ertrug es stoisch. Wir aber waren außer uns. Er musste ins Krankenhaus. Da wir fürchteten, dass die Explosion die Aufmerksamkeit der übrigen Hausbewohner auf uns gelenkt haben könnte, trafen wir alles Dynamit, Quecksilber, Draht und so weiter (...) in meine Wohnung. (...) Die Erde hatten wir im Zimmer aufhäufen können. Nach Beendigung der Arbeit, wollten wir sie wegbringen für den Fall einer Besichtigung der Häuser vor der Durchfahrt des Zaren. Ich fand in meiner Wohnung einen Platz, wo man die Erde hinschaffen konnte. Wir brachten sie zu mir in Körben, Paketen und Bündeln, die ich leerte, wenn die Hausbewohner abwesend waren und unser Dienstmote mit einem Auftrag wegschickt wurde. Inzwischen waren die Gerüchte von einer Reise des Zaren nach Livadia verstummt. Bald darauf erhielten wir vom Komitee Weisung, die Arbeit einzustellen. (...) Der Laden wurde geschlossen, in den unterirdischen Gang war schon vorher die Erde auf gleichem Wege, wie wir sie herausgeholt hatten, zurückgebracht worden. Ich half dabei, indem ich nachts die Säcke mit Erde in den Keller brachte, wo die Männer sie feststampften.“


Wera Figner: *Das Attentat auf den Zaren Alexander II*, Malik Verlag, Berlin 1926, Reprint Leipzig, 1981, p. 40.



Hump Mine, Museum der Träume, Toy Museum, Annaberg, anonymous, beginning 20th century







A poor miner who was injured in his job by a shot on the right forearm and chest is asking for a little support Thuringia, beginning 20th century, in Theatrum Mundi, Puppentheatersammlung, Dresden, 1984



The event- and streetartist Peter Püschmann, 3.9.2010, Oelsnitz

References

In the region of Saxony and Thuringia there are carving associations where Christmas mountains and model mines are still built – to keep the memory of mining through handicraft. One of the main self-organized institutions, the Verband Erzgebirgischer Schnitzer, was founded after the closing of the socialist culture houses of the GDR in the 1990s. http://www.lindenholz.homepage.t-online.de/ves_geschichte.htm

This model, supposed to be in the exhibition in April, was manufactured by Claus Kempe, an auto mechanic from Olbernhau, in 2004.



Lateinamerika koloniales Gedächtnis. Vom Ende der Ressourcen, so wie wir sie kennen

Hebbel am Ufer Theater (HAU3), Tempelhofer Ufer 10, 10963 Berlin

organizer: Goethe Institute, Buenos Aires; Hebbel am Ufer Theater (HAU), Berlin; Federal Center for Political Education and the Capital Cultural Fund, Berlin

October 15, 2010 - October 16, 2010

Program

Panel 1: "The Limits of Resource Sale"

Friday, October 15th, 6:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

The Consequences of Monoculture Food Security; Accumulation through expropriation in Latin America; Peak Oil, Peak Soil and Peak World. Concrete experience from the movements.

With:

Eduardo Molinari (Arg.)

Raul Zibechi (Uruguay)

Gipi Fernández (Arg.)

Elmar Altvater (D)

Moderation: Benny Härlin (D)

Panel 2: "The Open Veins of Latin America"

Saturday, October 16, 2:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.

The new mining boom in Latin America as a social conflict area; 'Indigenous' models of nature conservation versus exploitative production matrix; Nature as legal entity in Ecuador; Concrete experience from the movements against opencast mining.

With:

Maristella Svampa (Arg.)

Javier Ponce (Ecuador)

Gabriela Romano (Arg.)

Mirta Antonelli (Arg.)

Moderation: Klaus Schenck (D) o'clock

Panel 3: "Beyond Eurocentrism"

Saturday, October 16, 5 p.m. to 7 p.m.

Latin American attempts at alternative state models; The Evo Morales case: between indigenism and export constraints; Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution; Neocolonialism / Postcolonialism: the idea of Latin America; concrete experiences from the movements. With:

Luis Tapia (Bolivia)

Fernando Coronil (Venezuela / USA)

Chacho Liempe (Mapuche)

Moderation: Gabriela Massuh (Arg.)

Panel 4: "Latin America in Global Geopolitical and Ecological Dynamics"

Saturday, October 16, 8 p.m. to 10 p.m.

Latin America within the new imperialist world order; Resources, Militarization and Social Movements: The IIRSA and Accelerating Competition in Latin America; Peak Soil - The global hunt for land and the forced corruption of local governments; The new rulers of the world and their global opponents. With:

Stefan Schmalz (D)

Ana Esther Ceceña (Mexico)

Thomas Fritz (D),

Moderation: Peter Birle (D)

(Lateinamerikas koloniales Gedächtnis. Vom Ende der Ressourcen, so wie wir sie kennen

<https://www.hsozkult.de/event/id/termine-14670>

DAS POTOSÍ-PRINZIP

Wie können wir das Lied des Herrn im fremden Land singen?

Ausstellung + Arbeitstage

8.10.2010 – 2.1.2011

ARBEITSTAGE

Freitag, 8. 10. – „Eine ursprüngliche Akkumulation, die nur so genannt ist“

Konferenzraum 1, Theatersaal, Café Global
Konzeption und Ausformungen der modernen europäischen Gesellschaft und ihres

Wirtschaftssystems können nicht ohne die koloniale Vergangenheit und ihre Verbrechen gedacht werden. Diese voraussetzungsreiche Bedingtheit setzt sich bis heute und sie setzt sich global fort. Der Marx'sche Begriff der ursprünglichen Akkumulation dient diesem Arbeitstag als Analyseinstrument der gegenwärtigen und historischen Bedingungen, die anhand dreier Fallbeispiele – Erdbeeren, Soja, Kokain – konkretisiert werden.

12.00 – 14.00 „Sogenannte Ursprüngliche Akkumulation?“

Workshop

Ort: Konferenzraum 1 (K1), Haus der Kulturen der Welt (HKW)

Simultanübersetzung Englisch-Spanisch

Re-Reading des 24. Kapitels im ersten Band des Kapitals von Karl

Marx: Die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation

Moderation: **Thomas Kuczynski**

15.00 – 18.00 „Erdbeeren, Soja, Kokain“

Workshop

Ort: K1, HKW

Erdbeeren: „Mercado Energético Puro“

Isaías Grinolo

„Die Soja-Republik“

Eduardo Molinari

„The Long Memory of Cocaine“

John Barker und Max Jorge Hinderer

Moderation: **Max Jorge Hinderer**

19.00 – 22.00 „Eine ursprüngliche Akkumulation, die nur so genannt ist“

Vorträge und Diskussion

Kurzinput: „No puede de-colonizar sin de-patriarcalizar“,

Maria Galindo

Kurzinput: „Triumph der Hausarbeiterinnen“ Zu einer

Aktion der

Gruppe Territorio Doméstico in Madrid

Konstanze Schmitt

Key Note

„Caliban and the Witch“, **Silvia Federici**

Kurzinput: TIPPA/CVA: **Crisis Chronology**

Key Note

„Verkehrte Welt“, **Peter Linebaugh**

Diskussion

Moderation: **John Barker, Max Jorge Hinderer**

22.00 – 23.30 **Late Night Special**

Ort: Café Global, HKW

☿ **Matthijs de Bruijne** über „1000 dreams.org“

☿ **Sun Heng** (Migrant Worker Museum) – Migrant

Songs: „Our World,

Our Dream“

(Projektionen der Songtexte – Englisch)

